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Americans are inadequately represented. Despite being such an important part of political 
science, social choice theory remains an area of study seldomly incorporated into political 
dialogue. Special interest groups and gerrymandering insidiously affect political substructures 
and can have long-lasting impacts. Referendums often produce paradoxical results and 
frequently fail to satisfy voters. They can also restrict minority rights when political participation 
is in question. Voting systems around the world have remained unchanged for over two centuries 
and poorly express voter desires. Improving upon elements encompassed by social choice theory 
has the potential to ensure more accurate representation. The issue of gerrymandering can be 
mitigated using new identification and districting methods. Additionally, policy makers should 
take note that referendums are most useful with single issue topics. Lastly, voting systems like 
Majority Judgement offer to revolutionize the way voting is accomplished in America. This 
thesis showcases numerous correlations demonstrating representation shortfalls in each of these 
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Terms & Acronyms 
 
 
Social Choice Theory - the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a 
single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs 
(e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, 
preferences, judgments, welfare) 1 
 
Special Interest Group - a community within a larger organization with a shared interest in 
advancing a specific area of knowledge, learning or technology where members cooperate to 
affect or to produce solutions within their particular field, and may communicate, meet, and 
organize conferences. For the purpose of this review and for the sake of objectivity, special 
interest groups are considered groups that enable professional (paid advocates) to influence the 
political process in favor of SIGs.2 
 
Gerrymandering - in U.S. politics, drawing the boundaries of electoral districts in a way that 
gives one party an unfair advantage over its rivals.3 
 
Referendum - a direct vote in which an entire electorate is invited to vote on a particular 
proposal.  
 
Utility - is a term used by economists to describe the measurement of "useful-ness" that a 
consumer obtains from any good. Utility is the want satisfying power of any commodity or 
capacity of a commodity to give satisfaction.  
 
Instant Run-off Voting (IRV) - a type of ranked preferential voting method used in single-seat 
elections with more than two candidates. Instead of indicating support for only one candidate, 
voters in IRV elections can rank the candidates in order of preference.4 
 
Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) - a mixed electoral system in which voters get two votes: one 
to decide the representative for their single-seat constituency, and one for a political party. Seats 
in the legislature are filled firstly by the successful constituency candidates, and secondly, by 









1 Sandford Encyclopedia 
2 ACM.org 
3 Encyclopedia Britannica 
4 Fairvote Project 















“That ballots are the rightful, and peaceful, successors of bullets; and that when ballots have 
fairly, and constitutionally, decided, there can be no successful appeal, back to bullets.”6 






















6 Abraham Lincoln, “Letter to James C. Conkling”, August 26, 1863.  
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The Enlightenment brought about a miraculous concept. Perhaps individuals could 
collectively make informed decisions regarding their political fate without the assistance of a 
benign monarch. This concept brought forth a series of both economic and political revelations. 
Nicolas de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda, often considered the fathers of social choice 
theory, explored mechanisms for collective decision making without resorting to physical 
competition. Not only would their ideas change interactions between individuals, they would 
influence the interactions between future states. 
 Social choice theory is not one single theory, but a collection of procedures designed to 
optimize outcomes through collective agreement. It encompasses ideas such as Democratic 
Peace Theory and Pareto-optimal economic arrangements. Arguably, social choice theory 
remains excessively esoteric and is infrequently used in the political arena. Endeavoring to 
rectify this reality, this thesis refines social choice theory through an expansive exploration of 
both American and global political mechanisms. To do this, research is conducted on special 
interest groups and gerrymandering, referendums, and election reform. Each represents vital 
components of social choice theory that require attention. Warren Smith in his analysis of range 
voting consistently demonstrated the inadequacy of common voting systems. Lacy & Niou 
demonstrated the paradoxes generated by certain referendums. Nicholas Stephanopolous and 
Eric McGhee explained the issues with gerrymandering and articulated a proposed solution to 
those issues. The key finding in this thesis is that American voters are not adequately 
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represented. Despite this conclusion, numerous promising options exist that could mitigate the 
issue of inadequate representation.  
This thesis begins with a discussion of how special interest groups have had a deleterious 
impact on the political process. First, the thesis conducts a theoretical critique of interest group 
politics before addressing a few case studies. It then performs an exploration on gerrymandering 
by analyzing its impact on voter turnout. Next, in Chapter 2, the thesis explores theoretical and 
applied research on referendums before contrasting public acceptance of minority groups with 
referendum use. In Chapter 3, theoretical axioms for improved representation are discussed. 
Alternative forms of representation are suggested and an analysis of happiness and representation 
is demonstrated. The thesis concludes with policy recommendations for reform that will 
significantly improve voter representation despite the monumental political implications 
associated with each.  
There’s a balance any representative republic faces when it comes to petitioning the 
government. Governments that prevent citizens from bringing grievances or advocating for 
policies can hardly be said to be democratic. Unregulated special interest group lobbying, 
however, has the potential to significantly and detrimentally affect how voters are represented. 
Substantial evidence exists indicating that economic elite domination and biased pluralism forms 
of special interest groups are more prevalent in the United States than majoritarian electoral 
democracy or majoritarian pluralism. If this is true, the median voter theorem, the powerful idea 
that centrist voters dictate political outcomes, is less true than previously thought. Unregulated 
lobbying can harm specific policies and serious structural harm can occur.. Both lobbying 
government and drafting voting districts influence the political process yet neither involves 
electing officials. As a result, each present accountability issues. 
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Gerrymandering is the act of establishing voting districts that align with political goals. 
Any election system that chooses representatives through a district rather than a popular vote 
innately runs the risk of developing gerrymandered districts. Two types of gerrymandering exist. 
Whether intentional or not, it is possible for districts to be “packed” with voters who support one 
party or “cracked” so that powerful voting blocks are divided. Looking to further demonstrate 
the harm of gerrymandering, the research contained in this thesis analyzes voter turnout in 
several states using who are considered the most heavily gerrymandered.   
Nicholas Stephanopolous and Eric McGhee developed a metric labeled the efficiency gap 
that measures “wasted” votes. Wasted votes are any votes in excess of the 51 percent required to 
elect a candidate or any votes for a candidate who did not win. Using data from the United States 
Election Project, statewide voter turnout in the 2016 election was compared to the efficiency gap. 
Consequently, states that were most heavily gerrymandered according to Stephanopolous and 
McGhee’s efficiency gap also had the lowest rates of voter turnout. There is little surprise that 
states with districts that underrepresent voter wishes have discouraged voters, but the data 
supports what is already known about the detriments of gerrymandering.  
Extensive evidence that directly links gerrymandering and special interest groups is 
lacking but each can lead to significant underrepresentation in the United States. There are 
alternative election mechanisms around the world that may mitigate underrepresentation and 
since referendums are considered the most democratic elements of social choice theory, 
referendums are explored first. Insight can also be gained from international case studies. Since 




Referendums, as a social choice tool, are more complicated than they appear. Many 
believe they rectify issues of underrepresentation, but they frequently fail to accomplish this. 
While popular initiatives are widely used in democracies around the world and have been 
thoroughly studied, research that links their detriments to political consequences is lacking. 
Many view referendums as an expression of popular will while others vilify them as enablers of 
majoritarian tyranny.  
Referendums increase political energy and knowledge, but they have detriments as well. 
Lacy and Niou discovered that multi-issue referendums can produce paradoxical results. Because 
voters in referendums are not able to share information, they’re unable to vote strategically in the 
same manner that legislatures do. Sharing information in this context means vote trading. An 
example would be that one member might vote for one policy he cares little for and, in exchange, 
another voter may reciprocate the behavior. Consequently, referendums that include complex, 
multi-issue topics produce paradoxical results. Brexit is a prime case study for a referendum that 
encompassed numerous policy implications and demonstrates the resulting issues with complex 
multi-issue decision making.  
While academic prescription for referendums are mixed, there’s a greater danger in their 
use when they focus on minority political rights. Direct democracy measures are particularly 
harmful to political systems when they restrict the civic rights of others. When minority rights 
are restricted in democracies, the responsibility to rectify such abuses lie with the courts. There 
may be a way, however, to reduce judicial burden without expanding the court system by 




Simon Hug and George Tsebelis identified four different types of referendums. These are 
those triggered by the acting government, the citizens, or a mixture between the government and 
the citizens. Using data from the World Values Survey and the countries identified by Hug and 
Tsebelis, public attitudes toward immigration are compared to different types of national 
referendums around the world.  Countries that use referendums seemingly have citizens more 
accepting to immigrants. 
 This result is peculiar for a variety of reasons. If direct democracy measures can restrict 
minority rights it is not immediately clear why nations with common referendum use are more 
accepting to immigrants. It is possible that nations with lower racial tension have no issue 
incorporating direct democracy measures while nations that have challenging racial relationships 
reject referendum use. The conclusion lacks robustness but the framework for study is still 
notable and leads to several questions that could clarify the data. It is possible further state or 
district level studies would reveal if referendums truly impact majority/minority relationships by 
controlling for national cultural differences and conducting statewide or regional studies. This 
area of research could also benefit from more insight onto specific policy issue outcomes 
between legislatures and referendums to identify where each maximizes voter utility. Clearly, 
referendums are not the silver bullet that rectifies underrepresentation but are merely an element 
of the solution. A more potent solution might involve election reform.  
The United States uses a first past the post or winner take all election systems to choose 
representatives for political office. It is easy to understand, intuitive, easy to implement, and a 
inefficient method of expressing voter wishes. A plurality is required for candidates to win 
elections and competition beyond one party is structurally discouraged. These issues lead to 
significant underrepresentation at all levels of political office.  
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How might one choose a superior election system? Typically, political theorists turn to 
axioms to test the desirability alternatives. The first is that the process should not be decided by 
one individual. This non-dictatorship is almost self-evident but is necessary because all other 
axioms can be fixed if only one individual’s preference matters. The second rests on Condorcet 
and his win criterion. This idea is that the winner should win when paired against all other 
candidates in one on one match ups. While not identical, this concept mirrors the notion that 
candidates should receive at least 51 percent of the vote to win since a Condorcet win criterion is 
always met when this is the case. 
 The third axiom is independence of irrelevant alternatives. First past the post voting in 
the United States fails this axiom most clearly. It is also called the “spoiler effect”. The spoiler 
effect is when similar candidates enter a political race and the candidates most closely aligned 
split votes so that the minority candidate results in a greater plurality of votes. It is the violation 
of this axiom that results in an inevitable two-party system. The last axiom is called 
monotonicity. This axiom is most frequently violated by instant runoff systems where candidates 
are ranked. It states that ranking a preferred candidate better should not cause that candidate to 
lose and ranking a preferred candidate worse should not cause them to win. This happens when 
voters strategically and choose weaker candidates to eliminate more competitive challenges from 
the contention, so the final race is relatively uncompetitive.  
 Before moving on to explain research methodology in this chapter for identifying ideal 
voting systems, it is important to discuss one alternative frequently promoted in academic circles 
that is rejected in this thesis. Mixed member proportional voting is a type of election system that 
incorporates parties and individuals into the voting process and is a commonly recommended 
replacement to first past the post voting. Citizens vote for a party and for an individual. Parties 
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are then given the power to dictate who gains seats based on the percentage of votes the party 
received in the election. Mixed member proportional voting solves the issue of gerrymandering 
outright but has several components that American voters might find unpalatable.  
The first is that it incorporates political parties as a part of the political process. This 
reduces voter expression further by allowing parties to choose representatives rather than voters. 
Such a contentious practice would likely be rejected in the United States. The second 
problematic element of mixed member proportional voting is that it possesses the same issues as 
first past the post voting. Instead of fringe candidates dictating the political process with a 
plurality of votes, fringe parties gain disproportionate power in the political process. Because 
mixed member proportional voting systems are split, they require coalition building by their very 
nature. Centrist and popular parties often lack the necessary support to enact legislation and 
require compromise with smaller fringe parties for necessary support.  
Knowledge of commonly accepted axioms for superior election systems permits a more 
nuanced analysis of alternatives. The most promising voting systems are approval and range 
voting depending on the election time scale. Approval and range voting are simple to understand 
and meet each criteria previously listed. Each eliminate the spoiler effect, are monotonic, and 
elect representatives that receive 51 percent of the vote. Approval voting is the act of stating 
whether or not a candidate is acceptable or not for all possible candidates. Instead of choosing 
one candidate voters are able to approve multiple candidates. The candidate who receives the 
highest approval is elected. Range voting is similar in that all candidates are voted on, but a 
continuum of preference is possible. Instead of a simple yes or no, candidates receive a scaled 
vote. The most promising form of range voting is Majority Judgement theorized by Michel 
Balinski and Rida Laraki. Majority Judgement asks voters to judge candidates on a scale from 
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unknown to great. The vote might include grades such as “unknown, bad, okay, good, great”. 
Voters are best able to express their desires and candidates with the best grade are elected. There 
is also an added signal benefit where candidates know the strength of their mandate after 
election.  
It may seem self-evident that different political systems impact the happiness of 
electorates but attempts to study direct ties to national voting systems and happiness have not 
previously occurred. This is likely due to the intangible nature of happiness and its philosophical 
components. One institution, however, boldly attempts to capture happiness concretely. The 
World Happiness Index is the most powerful widely available data that expresses happiness 
analytically. The report considered Gallup World Polls and six other factors including GDP, life 
expectancy, generosity, social support, freedom, and corruption. Each sub-category includes 
numerous factors as well. The yearly report contains dozens of variables that make isolation 
difficult but when similar variables are manipulated remarkable trends can be noticed.  
Attempting to rectify the lack of research on happiness, this thesis compared happiness 
from 105 nations and categorized regions and national governments. The results demonstrated 
that multi-party systems have noticeable positive impacts on national happiness. Middle Eastern 
monarchy and autocratic style governments have clearly depressed happiness index scores. 
Another fact emerged from the data analysis as well. A nation’s liberal tendencies influenced its 
national happiness significantly more than its type of government. Liberal in this context is a 
nation that prioritize securing human and individual rights. Nordic states, North, and South 
American nations that incorporated political mechanisms securing these rights had noticeable 
happiness advantages over those that did not place such a high emphasis on human rights. 
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The elements of social choice theory contained in this thesis provide evidence to suggest 
American voters are underrepresented. Despite this fact, the outlook remains optimistic. 
Numerous options within social choice theory exist to mitigate representation inefficiency. The 
impact of special interest groups and gerrymandering can be significantly hampered by 
incorporating the efficiency gap metric and turn based districting strategies. Referendum 
efficiency can be increased by using referendums for single issue policy decisions with simple 
outcomes. Minorities can also be inoculated from the passions of majority voters through more 
systematically triggered referendums than referendums triggered by the populous. Different 
referendum styles exist, and policy makers can use this to their advantage. Lastly, and most 
importantly, election reform offers the greatest promise of lasting structural and behavioral 
change to American political life. The antiquated system of first past the post has far exceeded its 
shelf life and range voting alternatives have shown to be more representative of voter wishes in 
both computational models and in nature.  
Nicolas de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda provided the world with gifts that have 
yet to be claimed. The United States, being a bastion of progress and the oldest constitutional 
republic, has the opportunity and means to show the world how powerful small improvements to 
social choice mechanisms are.  In doing so, representation inefficiencies within the American 













 Pollution is bad for a variety of reasons. Beside the obvious damage to the environment 
in which we live, pollution arguably affects the freedom. In economics an externality is the 
consequence of an individual action that impacts others. Negative externalities harm groups 
without involving all affected members in the decision-making progress.  
In political science, these externalities occur when political action affects the larger 
political process and little to no accountability exists as recourse for negative effects. Special 
interest groups and gerrymandering are two mechanisms that can and often do negatively affect 
representation. This thesis chapter presents several case studies outlining how special interest 
groups can have deleterious effects on the political process. Additionally, it addresses 
gerrymandering and conducts an empirical analysis of voter turnout in heavily gerrymandered 
states to showcase how negative political externalities can have compounding effects overtime.  
In the United States there is a belief that minority groups hold more power than  
appropriate. In his farewell address to the nation, President Ronald Reagan warned Americans 
against the power of special interests and iron triangles. "A triangle of institutions - parts of 
Congress, the media and special interest groups – is transforming and placing out of focus our 
constitutional balance..."7  Petitioning legislators is a fundamental component of representative 
government but left unregulated, the effects can be detrimental to democratic government. This 
dynamic has created a dynamic where individuals who are not accountability have the ability to 
 
7 Peterson, Paul E. 1990. “The Rise and Fall of Special Interest Polit.” Political Science Quarterly 105(4): 539–56. 
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affect the larger political process. The existence of such an unaccountabile dynamic warrants 
review 
There are numerous studies that delve into special interest group behaviors. This chapter 
seeks to identify the relationship between special interest groups and voter turnout in highly 
gerrymandered states. To accomplish this, it categorizes several major schools of thought on the 
structural outcome of interest group politics and how they lead to gerrymandering as well as 
offer modified metrics policy makers can use to alleviate the harm of gerrymandering. To do 
this, a literature review of the history of special interest groups is presented. The main schools of 
thought on interest group politics are given. Understanding the history of lobbyism in America 
through the discussion of several case studies provides deeper context to the dynamic. Lastly, 
gerrymandering in its current form in conjunction with the data on voter turnout is shown. 
 Special interest groups have grown from discreet, state directed lobbies to the massive 
behemoths that now reside within the nation’s capital. While lobbyists have existed since the 
creation of the American Republic, the nature of the modern interest groups have transitioned 
them into a much more powerful player in government. Consequently, it is clear negative 
externalities have manifested as interest group influence has expanded.  
The second mechanism influencing the political process with little direct political 
accountability is gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the practice of drawing political districts in 
a way most favorable to a political goal. The act can create symbiotic relationships between even 
opposed political groups to form non-competitive, politically stable zones of representation. This 
district drawing, however, is heavily impacted by special interest groups. 
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 The term special interest group has become pervasive in the American political system 
and, to many, a pejorative label. Political scientists have turned their gaze to these groups and 
asked whether interest groups in their current form are desirable. James Madison, in Federalist 
10, foresaw this type of factional behavior. He believed that competing interests would prevent 
any single faction from obtaining too much power. In the idealized conception of a republic, 
laws and policy are guided by the mantra “one man, one vote”.8 9 Current interactions between 
interest groups and government might prevent this from being the case.  
 There is a notable lack of consensus among political scientists as to what defines a 
special interest group. This lack of agreement has proven problematic for the study of such 
groups. According to Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, authors of Special Interest Politics, 
some authors use the term broadly to refer to any subset of voters who have similar social or 
demographic characteristics, or similar beliefs, interests, and policy preferences. “Others reserve 
the term for membership organizations that engage in political activities on behalf of their 
members”.10  
Thomas Clive of Britannica is one such author who defines special interest groups 
broadly, with his definition being “any association of individuals or organizations, usually 
formally organized, that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence 
public policy in its favour.”11 The issue with this definition is that it makes objective study more 
difficult. Associations can change frequently and quickly. It is also difficult to ascertain the 
 
8 Madison, James. “The Federalist No. 10.” The Federalist #10. http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm. 
9 Smith, J. Douglas; On Democracy’s Doorstep: The Inside Story of How the Supreme Court Brought “One Person, 
One Vote” to the United States; pp. 4-18 ISBN 0809074249 
10 Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. Special Interest Politics. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Elhanan_Helpman/publication/23573546_Special_Interest_Politics/links/56adf
5fa08aeaa696f2e8baa.pdf. 
11 Clive, Thomas. “Interest group.” Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/interest-group. 
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actual membership composition when these groups are defined as such. For the purpose of this 
review and for the sake of objectivity, special interest groups are considered groups that enable 
professional (paid advocates) to influence the political process in favor of special interest groups. 
This definition has its faults, mainly that it restricts the study of interest groups to professional 
organizations, but it is the definition most suited to quantitative analysis.  
 This leads to a discussion regarding the consequences of special interest groups on the 
American political system. The traditional positive view of interest groups holds that they 
contribute to the democratic process by enabling minorities an opportunity to be heard, that they 
allow for more refined representation, offer technical solutions that non-specialists would be 
unable to provide, and offer a voice for those who lack the means to be heard. Conversely, the 
critics of such behavior argue that interest groups lead to a type of pluralistic inefficiency, ignore 
the larger interests of the public, and have a propensity to flirt with criminal behavior.12 Lastly, 
special interest groups can also impact how parties conduct their districting by infusing parties 
with the means to gerrymander by financing districting plans and lobbying parties. 
 Theodore Lowi articulates that the influence of interest groups has unduly infiltrated the 
political process. This is most apparent in his 1967 contribution to The American Political 
Science Review titled “The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism”. 13 His body of work 
supports the notion that interest group liberalism (the quantity and involvement of special 
interest groups) has gone well beyond what was expected in the nation’s early onset. Lowi 
argues that identity politics associated with special interest groups has been adopted by both 
 
12 “6 Advantages and Disadvantages of Interest Groups.” FutureofWorking.com. https://futureofworking.com/6-
advantages-and-disadvantages-of-interest-groups/. 
13 Lowi, T. (1967). The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism. The American Political Science Review, 
61(1), 5-24. doi:10.2307/1953872 
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conservative and liberal political factions despite the traditional liberal nature of such groups. 
“Concern for the proper relation of private life and public order was always a serious and 
effective issue”. 14  
Lowi’s overall stance regarding special interest groups is critical but he provides 
prescription as well. “Restoring pluralism as an effective principle of democratic politics requires 
destroying it as a principle of government. If this is to be accomplished, reform must begin with 
the replacement of interest group liberalism with some contemporary version of the rule of law.” 
15 CNN journalist Fareed Zakaria is in the same school of thought. Zakaria’s book, The Future of 
Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, presents the argument that over-
democratization has occurred at every level of American government.16 This trend, it is argued, 
has created significantly more gridlock and postured representatives to be more vulnerable to 
influence from small minorities.  
The increased transparency of individual vote tallying in the latter half of the 20th 
century created unforeseen consequences. It should go without saying that accountability in a 
democracy in desirable but individual vote tallying had the effect of binding representatives to 
special interest groups. Each vote is now tracked by lobby groups with the inclination and ability 
to do so. The American taxpayer may stand to lose $4 per person on a wool subsidy where 100 
farmers could gain $100 million.  
This incentive structure, as argued by both Zakaria and Lowi, does little to correct 
accountability and representation inefficiencies. Most Americans might have a vested interest in 
 
14 Ibid p.5. 
15 Ibid p.24. 




seeing that such a subsidy goes unfulfilled but are not irrational enough to spend resources 
advocating against such a policy. Authors Geene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, in their 
research on electoral competition and special interest group politics, found that lobby groups are 
able to influence legislative action through vote coalitions and campaign contributions. The idea 
that follows is that it is not fully the public welfare that decides policy in the system. The special 
interest group that convinces representatives that voters and campaign funding can result from 
certain behavior is able to dictate that representative’s behavior and, consequently, policy. Such 
actions, as argued by this school of thought, are largely undemocratic.  
  
“Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens” evaluates 
what groups actually wield power within government. 17 Martin Gilenz and Benjamin Page’s 
research falls in line with previously mentioned researchers but differ in their postulation of four 
major types of governance with these being Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite 
Domination, Majoritarian Pluralism, and Biased Pluralism. The conclusion drawn from their 
study is that  
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business 
interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens 
and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide 
substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased 
Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism 18 
 
 
17 Gilenz, Martin, and Benjamin Page. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average 
Citizens .” http://amadorcountynews.org/2014-04/American percent20Politics percent20- percent20Elites, 
percent20Interest percent20Groups, percent20and percent20Average percent20Citizens.pdf. 
18 Ibid p.2 
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This conclusion supports the notion that economic and business interest groups significantly 
impact policy far more than specific median mass-based interest groups. This type of situation is 
concerning in that it creates an environment where the median voter has less sway than would be 
expected. However, it should be noted that policy making is not necessarily a zero-sum game. 
The desires and interests of affluent business elites often coincides with the median voter. In 
such a system, there are not necessarily “winners and losers”. The concern is the repercussion 
when those interests divide.  
A final point: even in a bivariate, descriptive sense, our evidence indicates that the responsiveness 
of the U.S. political system when the general public wants government action is severely limited. 
Because of the impediments to majority rule that were deliberately built into the U.S. political 
system – federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism – together with further impediments due 
to anti-majoritarian congressional rules and procedures, the system has a substantial status quo 
bias 19  
 
The results are not entirely surprising and demonstrate the inherent limitations of majority will 
within American government. The status quo bias as mentioned here may be conducive to better 
long-term decisions. However, it may also be the source of great constituent frustration.  
It should be said that not all research presents such a critical view of special interest 
groups. “Special interests may have been steadily gaining in influence throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, but both during the Reagan years and during the initial years of the Bush administration, 
these groups lost much of the clout they had once acquired”. 20 Paul Peterson, in his article “The 
Rise and Fall of Special Interest Politics”, presents data showing federal expenditures and 
revenues as a percentage of GNP with regard to the expenditure of such GNP on special interest 
groups that matched his definition. His results are that interest groups are diminishing in power 
 
19 Ibid p.18 




but Peterson cautions interpretation of his data and noted that such a trend was largely the result 
of a declining defense budget. “Deficit reduction will undoubtedly become a high priority, and 
this goal by itself could absorb the entire reduction in the cost of national defense. Our findings 
thus support the thesis that strong parties and centralized decision-making leave interest groups 
in a relatively disadvantageous position.” 21  
Peterson’s research concluded in 1990 which was a period with declining U.S. 
involvement in international affairs. It is clear with the events of 2001 that such isolationist 
tendencies did not last. This does not discredit researchers in the same camp as Peterson outright. 
It may, for example, support the idea that a cyclical interest group power structure exists where 
groups have more or less control depending on the time in which they exist. Amitai Etzioni joins 
Peterson with his case countering the prevailing public belief that “interest groups [are] 
threatening to pluralistic democracy. In “Special Interest Groups Versus Constituency 
Representation”, the benefits, he argues, are conferred mostly from constituency-representing 
organizations and not as much from minority organizations.22 Authors in Peterson and Etzioni’s 
school of thought demonstrate that interest groups either 1. pose no threat to the stability of the 
government or 2. serve a valuable function in the democratic process. Etzioni postulates that 
elimination of interest groups would be neither feasible or desirable.  
Research pertaining to special interest groups and minority influence on the American 
political process is relatively new, but the institution and practice of lobbying has existed long 
before the nation’s conception. Knowing the evolution of such a practice into the modern 
conception is vital for understanding the why and how such practices exist and the consequence 
 
21 Ibid p.556 
22 Etzioni, A. (1985). Special interest groups versus constituency representation. Research in Social Movements, 
Conflicts and Change, 8, 171-195. 
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of such. The early stages of lobbying occurred largely at the state level. The national government 
was imbued with the ability to regulate inter-state commerce, but real power was held by the 
states. “When lobbying did happen in those days, it was often ‘practiced discreetly’ with little or 
no public disclosure”.23 Such discreet behavior can be perceived by some to be one in the same 
as corruption. It is only through transparency, it is argued, that the two concepts can be 
differentiated.   
Margaret Thompson weaves a detailed account of the intense lobbying performed by rail 
road companies in the wake of the Civil War as the earliest, best documented case of lobbying in 
her book, Lobbying in the Age of Grant.24 The practice continued to grow and was most evident 
through the passage of a series of service member acts following WWI. The size and scope of 
special interest groups in the nation became such a concern that President Hoover, in his augural 
address to the nation, warned that a “locus swarm of lobbyists plagued Congress”. 25 The topic of 
special interest groups was finally addressed formally in the Supreme Court Case United States 
v. Rumely. In 1953, the court ruled that lobbying is Constitutional but stipulated that personal 
contact between representatives and congressmen shall be illegal.  
It is said that lobbying itself is an evil and a danger. We agree that lobbying by personal contact 
may be an evil and a potential danger to the best in legislative processes. It is said that indirect 
lobbying by the pressure of public opinion on the Congress is an evil and a danger. That is not an 
evil; it is a good, the healthy essence of the democratic process...26 
 
 
23 DeKieffer, D. E. (1997). The citizen's guide to lobbying Congress. Chicago Review Press. 
24 Thompson, M. S. (1983, September). Corruption–or Confusion? Lobbying and Congressional Government in the 
Early Gilded Age. In Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies (Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 169-193). Taylor 
& Francis Group. 
25 Herbert Hoover: "Address Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination.," August 11, 1932. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
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This case set the foundation for the modern lobby industry. Money has poured into the nation’s 
capital since 1953 and this infusion of cash, coupled with technological change, has led to a 
complex relationship between representatives and constituents. Now, forms of communication 
like private e-mail servers, untraceable text applications, and complex interaction rules have 
obscured the interactions between special interest groups and representatives. In addition, the 
aspect of a “revolving door” where congressmen leave their elected positions for more lucrative 
lobbying positions has created a perception of mistrust in the nation’s leadership27. 
 
 The discussion on the impact of special interest groups would be lacking without 
providing several specific case studies. Dr. Lowi’s assertion that both ends of the political 
affiliation spectrum have become dominated by special interest groups is most evident with the 
defense and healthcare industry. The defense industry, the “Military Industrial Complex” as 
coined by President Eisenhower, has come to affect one of the largest government institutions at 
every level.  The complex array of relationships between government, businesses, and Congress 
have created an iron triangle of interests that all serve to reinforce each other.  
 In many respects, the lines have been blurred between military official and business 
associate. An example of this was the 2005 Air Force Tanker Lease contract. Shahnaz M. 
Punjani, in his report titled “The Iron Triangle Manifested: U.S. Air Force Tanker Lease 2001-
2005 Case Study”, details specific events that provide insight into not only private special 
interest groups but public special interest organizations such as branches of the Department of 





fundamental to the way we do business and I don’t see why we are considering leasing these 
aircraft, which is going to cost us far more than buying them at the end of the day. This is a bail 
out…” The summary of the scandal is summarized best by Punjani. 
The proposed lease of the KC–767 tanker aircraft was one of the most infamous procurement 
scandals of the post–Cold War era. Interactions within the military-industrial-congressional 
complex led to legislation permitting the Air Force to lease tankers from Boeing using an 
operating lease rather than standard procurement. Following the outcry from Congress, industry, 
the media, and numerous watchdog groups, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) 
launched a wave of investigations and hearings. During the lease debate, participants reached a 
number of compromises documented in congressional legislation. However, this was not 
sufficient to continue the lease process. After nearly 4 years, Congress cancelled the tanker lease 
and directed the Air Force to pursue a traditional procurement approach28 
 
This example involved every aspect of what is traditionally considered undesirable from 
special interest groups. It started with Senator Ted Stevens who contacted the Air Force and 
asked for ‘a proposal using ‘creative funding’ to acquire new Boeing aircraft to replace part of 
the aging KC–135 air-tanker fleet. The tanker fleet was created in the 50’s and has been showing 
severe signs of age. The Air Force responded by using what is called OME funds or Operations 
and Maintenance funding to fund the lease for the Boeing 767 adapted commercial variant. Such 
a clear violation of standard operating procedures was the first sign of trouble.  
As the lease contract continued, Congress, government watchdog groups, think tanks, and 
executive offices raised concern that the contract was too expensive and the need not urgent 
enough to warrant such spending. All the while, Boeing managed to create an arrangement 
through the company Wilmington Trust to garner private investments to fund the project so that 
neither the Air Force nor Boeing would incur any risk. “At the end of the lease, the Air Force 
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would either return the aircraft to Wilmington Trust or purchase them for an additional $44 
million per aircraft”.29  
Clearly, an investment firm would have little desire to acquire an asset completely out its 
scope and the Air Force would have little desire to relinquish a valued asset. The arrangement 
favored private investors with the taxpayer bearing the burden. The entire contract was cancelled 
upon news of ethical misconduct by a former employee. “Darleen Druyun was one of the key Air 
Force officials working with Boeing during the lease negotiations. After her retirement from 
government service, she took a position at Boeing as Deputy General Manager for Missile 
Defense Systems on January 3, 2003”.30 This act was the final blow to the tanker lease contract. 
Not only had numerous ethical and procedural barriers been breached but a key official broke an 
anti-corruption law aimed at preventing such favoritism in the acquisition process.  
This case study provides a valuable insight into the types of behaviors that are witnessed 
within the defense sector. The concern is not that individuals acted in such a manner but that the 
process permits and, it could be argued, encourages such interactions. The bureaucratic 
complexity of the process, coupled with the desire to implement purchases quickly, creates a 
perverse environment rife for exploitation. This specific study demonstrates all aspects of 
lobbying but is relatively narrow in scope. The Affordable Care Act, on the other hand is an 
example of legislation with far broader special interest group involvement. 
The year 2010 marked an important milestone to progressive special interest groups. 
President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act into law. The 
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law aimed to provide insurance for up to 15 percent of Americans unable to pay for health 
insurance and made it illegal for insurance companies to discriminate against preexisting 
conditions31. It was designed to increase quality and affordability through mandates, subsides, 
and insurance exchanges.  
Throughout the process the Health Care for America Now (HCAN) group, a collection of 
over 1,000 health care-oriented groups, managed a coalition aimed at pursuing a public health 
option.32 The act was severely hobbled by challenges to the individual mandate portion of 
legislation. Michael Tanner of the CATO Institute explained the dilemma in his 2006 report on 
health care mandates. Insurance companies respond to an inability to price on preexisting 
conditions by raising prices on healthy individuals. Such a response incentivizes healthy 
individuals to opt out (knowing they can return to the market if they require). The decreased 
customer base amplifies the issue further. As a result, insurance prices spiral out of control until 
the market collapses.  
The saving grace of the Affordable Care Act occurred with a Supreme Court Ruling. The 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was a 5-4 decision by the court that 
upheld the individual mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act. 33 However, the penalty for 
refusing to purchase insurance was removed. While HCAN was not successful, they represent a 
clear example of the “interest group liberalism” that Dr. Lowi presented. This example 
demonstrates how the scope and complexity of the lobby industry has intensified in both the 
conservative and progressive political realm. 
 
31 “Why is Obamacare so controversial?” 2016. BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-24370967. 
32 "Focus on Health Reform: Summary of New Health Reform Law" (PDF). The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation. April 15, 2010. 
33 Law, S. C. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. 
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Each of these case studies provide fruitful examples of the iron triangles of special 
interest groups, benefitting parties, and Congress. Since the Supreme Court Case U.S. v. Rumley, 
the defense industry has grown significantly, and clear examples of inappropriate incentives 
exist. The same can be said of the health industry. Both industries involve thousands of special 
interest groups who have showcased undesirable acts such as revolving doors and highlight the 
concept of biased pluralism. This system of pluralism stands in contrast to the argument that 
majority rule dominates the policy making agenda. It also shows how frequently special interest 
group politics affect the larger political process. Another mechanism with significant ability to 
influence the political process with little accountability is gerrymandering. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate the negative effects of gerrymandering and how they influence the larger political 
process. The empirical analysis used in this chapter utilizes a detection method postulated by 
Nicholas Stephanopoulous and Eric McGhee in Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency 
Gap. In their work the researchers articulate that a “gerrymander is simply a district plan that 
results in one party wasting many more votes than its adversary”. This waste is measured in 
votes for a candidate in excess of the 51 percent needed to win or votes for a candidate that does 
not win.  
Accordingly, there are two different forms of gerrymandering that occur. Cracking is 
when districts are drawn so that votes for one party are diluted for the opposing party to gain 
advantage. Packing is when districts are drawn to maximize the number of one specific party 
vote to ensure the district remains uncompetitive34. Gerrymandering presents several democratic 





chose. It also lessens representative responsiveness. When single parties dominate districts 
regardless of performance the democratic process is weakened.   
To date, no universal process exists that dictates how districts should be drawn. The 
Citizens for United States Directives organization explains that, “Though congressional 
redistricting is the responsibility of the States, special interests promoting a specific 
congressperson and party have a major influence on the process. In 36 states, redistricting is the 
responsibility of the state legislature; in seven states (AZ, HI, ID, NJ, WA and WV), redistricting 
is done by independent means; and seven states (AL, DE, MT, ND, SD, VT and WY) have only 
a single district35”. Specific economic entities within states can have tremendous influence on 
how districts are drawn. Despite the negative aspects of gerrymandering, numerous options exist 
for both detecting and correcting the issue. McGee and Stephanopoulous designed what they call 
the efficiency gap. The ratio as they explain, 
…represents the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election—where a 
vote is wasted if it is cast (1) for a losing candidate, or (2) for a winning candidate but in excess 
of what she needed to prevail. Large numbers of votes commonly are cast for losing candidates as 
a result of the time-honored gerrymandering technique of “cracking.” Likewise, excessive votes 
often are cast for winning candidates thanks to the equally age-old mechanism of “packing.” The 
efficiency gap essentially aggregates all of a district plan’s cracking and packing choices into a 
single, tidy number36. 
 
This solution rests on the assumption that political symmetry exists. Political symmetry is the 
formal recognition that two main parties exist, and the ratios of representatives should mirror 
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voter choice. If 100 representatives can be chosen and half of voters vote republican, then perfect 
symmetry would elect 50 republican voters.  
Such a mechanism offers courts and policy makers the ability to detect gerrymandering 
without partisan bias. A threshold would need to be chosen to identify when significant 
gerrymandering occurs. McGee and Stephanopoulous suggest 1.5 standard deviations from the 
mean efficiency gap which is roughly 2 congressional seats or 8 percent of most state 
legislatures. This suggestion covers all but the worst “14 percent of all congressional districting 
plans” and “12 percent of all state plans”. 37Lastly, it is recommended that, “To take into account 
this volatility, we propose treating a plan as presumptively invalid only if its gap exceeds the 
threshold we have identified, and the gap is unlikely to hit zero over the plan’s lifetime”. 
This methodology offers a detection method, but it fails to offer prescription for how 
districting could be accomplished to avoid unintentional gerrymandering. Wesley Pegden, Ariel 
Procaccia, and Dingli Yu used aspects of Game Theory to solve the issue. They suggest turn 
based strategies where two opposing parties would take turns picking and dividing districts.  
We design and analyze a protocol for dividing a state into districts, where parties take turns 
proposing a division, and freezing a district from the other party’s proposed division. We show 
that our protocol has predictable and provable guarantees for both the number of districts in 
which each party has a majority of supporters, and the extent to which either party has the power 
to pack a specific population into a single district. 
 
This method harkens to the age old “cut and choose method”. The cut and choose analogy is a 
classic strategy devised by economists to simulate optimal negotiating tactics. One person can 
cut the pie in any method they see fit and the other person gets to pick the piece they get. The cut 
 




and choose method in combination with the efficiency gap can drastically reduce intentional and 
unintentional gerrymandering.  
 The discussion so far has centered around detection mechanisms and methods for 
avoiding gerrymandering. However, this chapter also analyzes voter turnout in heavily 
gerrymandered states and compares it to states with partisan symmetry. This is done with data 
from the election project and McGee and Stephanopoulous’ efficiency gap metric. State 
efficiency gaps were compared to voter turnout and the national average. 
 














Using this methodology, the four most heavily gerrymandered states are North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, New York, and Texas. The difference in these states to the national 
average does appear to indicate that voter turnout is negatively hampered. Three of the five states 
(60 percent) showed reduced voter turnout compared to the national average whereas only five of 
twenty-one (23 percent) of the comparison states showed turnout below the national average. 
The data provided lacks depth, but it clearly demonstrates a compelling framework for the study 
of voter turnout and gerrymandering. More robust analysis could emphatically demonstrate 
additional unforeseen damage that gerrymandering could cause to democracies.  
The studies presented demonstrate that special interest groups exist, have grown in 
number over time, and the involvement of money in the political process has skyrocketed. 
Special interest groups in particular have the potential to do more than just harm specific policy 
goals. They have the potential to affect how political districts are drawn. Some scholars, such as 
Lowi, Zakaria, Gilenz, and Page are more critical in their stance on the structure and interaction 
of these groups with government.  
This school of thought holds that something must be done to regulate this component of 
the political process. The corrupting atmosphere, they argue, is too strong within the current 
lobby structure. Other thinkers, like Peterson, Etzioni, and the Supreme Court, present the idea 
that interest groups are relatively harmless or vital to the health of democracy. McGee and 
Stephanopoulous and Wesley Pegden, Ariel Procaccia, and Dingli Yu offer more prescription. It 
is from their methodology that the negative relationship between voter turnout and 
gerrymandering is demonstrated.  
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The two case studies offer differing political perspectives on the relationship between 
special interest groups and government. The first demonstrated the complexity of such special 
interest group interactions whereas the second highlighted the explosion of involvement from 
special interest groups in the legislative realm. The research provided paints a picture of their 
impact on American government, but certain questions remain unanswered.  
The influence of money on the political process is one of the biggest gaps in special 
interest group research. “Big money” is a term used quite often when referring to the concept of 
biased pluralism as presented by Gilenz and Page. Knowing the impact of campaign finance and 
lobbying expenditures would be the first vital step in curtailing undesirable effects. One question 
worth asking, for example, is what would happen if representatives had capped campaign 
budgets? Would curtailing the negative aspects of gerrymandering force government into 
recognizing party politics as fundamental to the structure of government?   
 Special interest groups do more than advocate for their agendas. They have the ability to 
significantly impact the political process in the United States. This type of negative influence 
with little accountability can have long-term consequences for representative efficiency. While 
not every interest group is economically oriented, every group seeks to influence policy. It is one 
thing for an interest group to sway a specific policy, but it is something entirely more insidious 
for an interest group to sway a political outcome for decades. Solutions related to 
gerrymandering are promising but there is reason to believe changing election methodology 
could mitigate the underlying issue associated with special interest groups and gerrymandering. 
Mitigating symptoms without correcting underlying systematic issues can often mask issues until 










At first look, it appears research on referendums is oversaturated. The expansive effort 
has explained benefits and issues, analyzed voter energy and knowledge, and even focused on 
how minority policy issues fair in referendums. Very little, however, has focused on the different 
types of referendums and how their use affects public attitudes toward minority groups. 
Expanding on the central premise of social choice theory, this chapter analyzes referendums and 
their impact on the polity and asserts that different types of referendums are more suited for 
various ethnic societal compositions. Through a corollary analysis of public attitudes toward 
immigrants and the dominant referendum used by a polity, insight is gained into how 
referendums affect public perception or which types of referendums tolerant societies prefer. 
Additional energy is devoted to evaluating referendum case studies within nations particularly 
hostile or welcoming to minorities. These efforts identify differences in the types of referendums 
nations incorporate and public attitudes toward minority groups. 
Social choice theory ties back to Condorcet’s ideas on voting and Kennith Arrow’s 
expansion on those ideas.38 It is the theoretical framework for combining preferences to 
optimally decide outcomes without resorting to physical conflict. Previous research focused on 
maximizing utility from election systems and this chapter takes a similar perspective by detailing 
referendums more conducive to inclusivity. As a tool within the framework of social choice, 
referendums are ubiquitous in democratic societies. Referendums, and many political scholars, 
 




frequently focus attention on the median voter theorem. The theorem is idea that the middle voter 
decides the outcome of a vote and this idea is central to democracy. Common concerns with 
democracies revolve around protection of minority groups. Referendums often encroach on and 
restrict minority rights. 39Knowing how referendums can be incorporated into society without 
devolving to majoritarianism and populism can ensure more informed policy outcomes. 
Simon Hug and George Tsebelis outline four types of referendums based on their work 
titled Veto Players and Referendums around the World. In their model, there are four types of 
referendums based on how two questions are answered. Namely, who initiates the referendum 
and who participates in the referendum? Veto players in this framework are those with traditional 
power mechanisms at their disposal. They are typically members of government. Non-veto 
players are those do not traditionally participate in the decision-making process. Thus, according 
to this categorization, the types of referendums are the ones required by law, veto player, popular 
vetoes, and popular referendums. Identifying the various types of referendums employed by 
different nations can highlight the relationship between majority and minority groups in those 
nations. 
Before detailing the methodology of this corollary analysis, it is important to understand 
key aspects of the larger referendum discussion. There is an impressive compendium of research 
on the subject. Some like Ian Budge found that results of initiatives might be incompatible with 
individual human rights or might endanger fiscal sustainability. Miachel Zurn has proposed 
greater use of referendums by incorporating automatic triggers whenever European Constitution 
changes are recommended. Heidrun Abromeit and Bruce Ackerman have determined research in 
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the field of referendums is in serious need of reorientation and “such a reorientation would 
address more directly how different types of referendums interact with the prevalent forms of 
representative democracy”.   
Other scholars like Schmitter and Riker have less optimistic views of referendums and 
advocate less use because “ad hoc referendums can be regarded as a particular form of agenda 
manipulation which aims at reducing, not increasing, the number of issue dimensions in electoral 
competition”. Additionally, there are those who show referendum inefficiency and introduce 
paradoxes associated with multi-issue referendums such as Lacy and Niou. Lastly, scholars like 
Nurmi argue cautious use of referendums. “Taken together, these two arguments imply that 
referenda are appropriate only in cases where there is a natural way to dichotomize the issue at 
hand. Moreover, whenever a referendum is called, its result should be binding”. 40 
Many see referendums as an expression of popular will. Others fail to link the two. 
Referendums have long been vilified by traditional theorists of political science. From 
California’s repeated state driven initiatives, to Brexit, to Egypt’s recent vote to extend 
presidential tenure, the social outcome of referendums is often dubious. Farah Mohammed in his 
contribution to JSTOR Daily explains that, “Proponents contend that referendum campaigns can 
increase politicization, political knowledge and efficacy, addressing, at least in a small way, the 
‘democratic deficit’. On the other side, some worry that referendums might bring out intolerance 
in mass publics and undermine minority rights.” Mohammed states that referendums make 
citizens feel “included, powerful, and consulted”. 
  
 





Excessive political energy is not always desirable when crafting complex policy. The 
increased political energy gained from direct referendums do not increase the likely-hood that a 
socially optimal outcome will occur. “While referendums maximize the number of participants 
in decision-making, they minimize the quality of participation by preventing voters from 
coordinating votes and voting issue-by-issue. Legislatures may minimize the number of 
participants, but they maximize the quality of participation by allowing vote-trading and issue-
by-issue voting”.41 
 The justification for most referendums strikes at the heart of social choice theory. These 
methods are implemented because they are believed to reveal exactly “what the people want”. 
But the people often do not know what they want and it’s of no fault of their own. Dean Lacy 
and Emerson Niou analyze this question using mathematically-based rational choice proofs in 
their 1998 paper titled A Problem with Referendums. The authors claim that multi-issue direct 
referendums prevent voters from making informed strategic decisions based on how other voters 
will decide. Since their decisions depend on how others will respond they often cast votes 
detrimental to what they would otherwise choose.  
When some voters have nonseparable preferences for the issues under consideration, referendums 
are unable to capture the complexity of those preferences. Referendums are not the embodiment 
of majoritarian democracy; instead, referendums may produce unstable collective choices that are 
opposed by a majority of voters or by all voters… A referendum may not select a Condorcet 
winner, and in many cases a referendum will select a Condorcet loser or a unanimous loser42  
 
Brexit is a great example where complex multi-issue policies were impacted by one vote. Should 
the United Kingdom leave the European Union is a simple question, but the question had 
multiple elements that impacted the decision. Voters may want new immigration policy but may 
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not seek any other changes. Leaving the European Union may have been detrimental to 
numerous voters. Since they can’t know what the rest of the voting population will do, the final 
decision may not be the optimal outcome.  
It is an understatement to claim that such an outcome is undesirable. Legislatures permit 
environments where voters share preferences – enabling voters to make strategic decisions over 
issues that depend on the outcome of other issues. “People voting on a referendum are forced to 
cast blind votes that consider neither the outcome of votes on related issues nor the preferences 
of other voters. Legislatures encourage communication and coordination, forms of political 
participation often overlooked by proponents of direct democracy, yet these forms of 
participation are crucial to the selection of optimal social outcomes when people hold 
nonseparable preferences”. 43 
The issue of unstable, paradoxical referendum results can be solved by implementing 
sequential issue decisions or isolating decisions to single-issue, non-complex votes. Both 
solutions have drawbacks. Sequential referendums can be costly to both voter and the 
government in time and money. Single issue referendums can run the risk of distilling multi-
faceted policy decisions into a binary yes or no decision. Due to these risks, if a direct 
democracy measure is desired, it would be more prudent to run sequential referendums in mid-
sized political environments such as cities and single-issue referendums at the national level.  
At the end of this dialogue are several conclusions. The first is that referendums produce 
results in-line with the median voter theorem. Understanding the theorem is essential to 
understanding the shortfalls of referendums. “The median voter theorem is perhaps the best-
known formal result in political economy and is the foundation of a huge empirical and 
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theoretical literature. In a pure median voter world, elected officials would adopt the position of 
the median voter, and their spending decisions would always be approved in referendums”. 44 
The second conclusion is, “that the political effect of referendums and initiatives is not a 
genuinely positive or negative one, but rather, it depends on the preferences of the median voter” 
45 In summary, despite their complications, referendums have a central place in democratic 
society.  
[Referendums] act as a check on legislatures and representatives that may have become too 
entrenched and disconnected from those who they are supposed to represent. Direct democracy is 
also a vehicle by which the electorate can send messages to their representatives stating that the 
way that they are conducting the business of government does not meet with the voters' approval. 
Sometimes, for better or worse, direct democracy broaches subjects that have been taboo with 
representatives. Lastly, direct democracy is viewed by the people of major Western states as 
being a vital institution of their civic expression. For these reasons, the institution of direct 
democracy has a place in democratic lawmaking. 46 
 
Despite the inefficiency of referendums, the prevailing attitude among political scholars 
is that they are necessary. It is believed referendums grant both legitimacy and stability for 
citizens to engage in direct decision-making. Referendums can be held in undemocratic societies, 
but the existence of referendums has intrinsic democratic value. Additionally, referendums can 
reveal a strong-preference or correct legislative inefficiency. As Lacy & Niou explain, “The 
primary weakness of a legislature as a tool of social choice is the likelihood that legislators will 
vote their own preferences rather than represent the preferences of their constituents. 
Legislatures are a highly imperfect method of revealing and aggregating social preferences, but 
they are better than direct voting mechanisms. 
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While research is sometimes conflicted about the prescription for referendum use, there is 
consensus on one significant fact. This fact is that referendums result in the median voter 
preference. “On the basis of our model, the introduction of the mere possibility of a referendum 
shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the median”. 47 This tendency favors 
competitiveness in electoral environments. But competitiveness can produce outcomes at odds 
with what is desirable for the stability of a polity where inclusivity is necessary.  
Not every political scholar recommends inclusiveness as an innate government pursuit. 
It’s self-evident that autocratic governments exclude political participation, but many 
democracies have exclusionary barriers to political participation as well. The United States and 
many western nations have historically limited political participation to the elite landowners or 
Caucasian men. However, according to Seline Shenoy, a diverse and inclusive society offers a 
variety of benefits that are both politically and economically beneficial. Such environments 
permit diversity of perspective and reduce tension between minority and majority groups.  
Economically, inclusive environments increase productivity since the broadest skillsets 
throughout the population can be incorporated into the workforce. The Governance, Social 
Development Humanitarian, and Conflict Organization released a 2015 report that studied the 
impact of inclusivity on economic growth, health of citizenry, social cohesion, and peace within 
society. They found higher rates of long-term economic growth when inclusive policies were 
incorporated in society. Results also found reduced rates of hospitalization due to chronic 
sickness in countries with widespread policies aimed at inclusion. Further, there is evidence to 
support the argument that inclusive societies, especially gender focused, have fewer internal and 
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external political conflicts. 48 With this evidence in mind, it can be asserted that inclusivity is 
desirable, especially for democratic societies. Referendum use, however, can clash with social 
cohesion and inclusivity. 
The real danger of majority referendums lies in votes excluding minorities from civic life 
entirely. “Studies show that that group thinking is key and is triggered by these direct democracy 
initiatives and referendums. Group thinking surfaces because of the way politicians and the 
media have framed issues. Once group thinking is triggered, minorities become vulnerable to 
majority ‘backlash’”. 49 The median voter is, by definition, a majority voter. Because of this fact,  
Direct democracy is not problematic merely because mathematics dictates that minorities will 
lose on many issues, including those issues about which they care the most. Rather, in all the 
cases that we have reviewed, issues that trigger majority group thinking are issues directly related 
to a minority group's status in the polity. Thus, majorities vote on the content of minorities' 
democratic citizenship standing. 50 
 
This exclusionary lock-out not only hampers inclusivity but incites social instability.  
The median voter theorem can result in stable polities, but it has a downside. Majority 
preferences frequently restrict minority civic rights. This potential outcome conflicts with a key 
assumption in this thesis which is that societal inclusivity or, at the very least, the ability to 
preserve political representation is vital to a healthy democracy. Currently, in the United States, 
when a conflict exists between a minority rights and a majority decision, resolution is handled by 
the courts. As entities a step removed from the so called “political thicket”, the courts are 
uniquely situated to serve as vanguards of minority rights that fall under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.  
 
48 Governance, social development, conflict and humanitarian knowledge services. (n.d.). Retrieved April 21, 2019, 
from https://gsdrc.org/ 
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Resolving equal protection under the law and the will of the sovereign is no easy task. 
The Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities 
Rights addresses the issue of majoritarian referendum consequences. “At an aggregate level, 
minorities "lose" roughly four out of five times. However, on closer examination, the story is 
more complex. Although antiminority results easily can be triggered by "we-they " group 
thinking and reflect more subtle expressions of prejudice, they also are vehicles for ideological 
conflicts. Because the dynamics are complex, but yet can threaten the polity's civic cohesion”. 51 
Civic cohesion undoubtedly affects the stability of any polity and especially one as diverse as the 
United States.  
To date, there have been two main solutions for mitigating the negative effects of 
referendums. Lacy and Niou recommend avoiding multi-issue questions to prevent paradoxes 
and inefficiencies. Sylvia Varga’s solution to the detriments of referendum repression relies on 
the courts through a proposed heighted/skeptical judicial review. However, those seeking to 
mitigate the negatives aspects of referendums need not accept the judiciary as the sole vanguard 
of civic participation. Another possible solution is to vary the type of referendum used based on 
the composition of the electorate.  
The methodology of this chapter assumes that referendums are the most direct reflection 
of popular democracy. It also assumes that minority rights are restricted when majorities express 
unchecked power. Using these assumptions, a comparative dynamic was created to see if 
frequent use of majority voting power hampers relationships with minorities by testing public 
attitdues on immigrants. If this is the case, it is expected that higher instances of referendum use 
lead to reduction in minority/majority relations and lower rates of immigration acceptance. Using  
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and Tsebelis’ framework on veto players, referendums in this study were classified based on 
whether they were conducted and decided by automatic constitutional mechanisms, by the acting 
government, by a mixture involving the citizens, or by a mixture not involving citizens. Nations 
employing these four types of referendums were compared to public attitudes toward 
immigration using data from the World Values Survey. This comparison, while imperfect, 
captures attitudes toward immigrants that can be closely compared to minority groups. It is 
recognized that some nations may have great hostility to minority groups and low or high levels 
of immigration, but this chapter assumes interchangeability of the two groups. 
 Of the countries Hug and Tsebelis studied, 32 were also included in the World Values 
Survey. Countries were separated into four referendum codes for ease of classification. The 
resultant categories had their publicly professed attitudes averaged with a total sample standard 
deviation of 14.18. Countries included lacking a classification are countries that were not 
classified by Hug and Tsebelis but were included for regional analysis and comparison. This type 
of analysis is unique in that it differentiates different types of referendums rather than consider 
referendums as a singular entity. These cursory results demonstrate that countries employing 
different types of referendums at the national level have significantly different views toward 
immigrants when categorized by referendum type. More analysis on this observation could yield 
beneficial for policy makers in democracies interested in using referendums as a social choice 
tool. Below is a chart showing the national attitudes toward immigrants and the type of 
referendum primarily used in the national government.  
 
Figure 2.  





The data above indicates the average hostility of citizens to immigrants was 20 percent of 
those polled. Poll size fluctuated close to 1,500 residents with the total polled being 48,774. No 
nation had a polling population where more than 50 percent were hostile to immigration. Those 
nations with the lowest hostility to immigrants tended to comprise of Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Uruguay, Peru with several exceptions being Poland, Spain, 
and Sweden. Countries most hostile to immigrants tend to be those in the Pacific region. Eastern 
European countries like Russia, Estonia, and Middle Eastern countries like Turkey and Qatar 
have strong attitudes rejecting immigrants as well. 
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 Countries that do not incorporate referendums at all were the most hostile to immigrants 
with 29 percent of the public professing to be hostile to immigrants. Referendums that 
incorporate citizens as both initiators and deciders in referendums had a lower level of hostility 
to immigrants. Types of governments did not appear to indicate public attitude toward 
immigrants. Sweden and Qatar had drastically differing attitudes toward immigrants: 3.5 percent 
to 40 percent hostile with drastically different rates of actual immigration: less than 1 percent of 
Sweden’s 10 million citizen population were immigrants where 94.1 percent of Qatar’s 2 million 
residents were foreign. 52 Disparities exist between professed governments and actual 
government composition. Russia and Turkey both profess to incorporate republic forms of 
government but have strong autocratic elements that make it difficult to classify the countries as 
democratic. Regardless, each of these countries are more in-line with regional attitudes of 
immigration.  
 Interpreting the results further, it is clear this specific analysis is not robust. It measures 
public acceptance to immigration with a cursory interpretation of what types of referendums are 
used in each country. It would also be beneficial for those seeking deeper analysis on 
referendums to conduct longitudinal time studies on specific countries to control for cultural 
variation and more concretely identify a relationship between minority relationships and 
referendum use. While the conclusions lack depth, they nevertheless establish an intriguing 
framework for deeper analysis. Countries that do not use referendums at all tend to be more 
hostile to minorities. It was expected that higher instances of referendum use lead to reduction in 
minority/majority relations and lower rates of immigration acceptance. However, based on these 
 





results, it is not clear if referendums reduce tension or countries with higher tension avoid 
referendum use. It also appears that countries where the population is involved in both the 
initiation and decision mechanisms are the least hostile toward immigrants. A brief comparison 
of the governmental makeup of the nations in question revealed wide disparity in attitudes to 
minorities. No link is established between the type of professed government and the population’s 
hostility toward immigrants.   
 Referendums can and do restrict minority rights. Why citizens in countries that employ 
referendums are more accepting to immigrants than those that do not is unclear. If a casual 
connection could be established with future research, these results could lead policy makers to 
make better prescriptions for referendum use in diverse political environments. Conversely, the 
results may simply reinforce the fact that political leadership knowingly restrict or prevent 
referendum use when majority-minority relations are weak to prevent further tensions.   
 The next portion of this chapter identifies several referendums and national 
characteristics within the nations holding the referendums. These cases grant insight into national 
referendums around the world and provide valuable observational data on the relation between 
minorities and referendums. The countries most hostile to immigrants are Azerbaijan; 40.6 
percent, South Korea; 44.2 percent, Qatar; 46 percent, and India with 47.1 percent of those 
polled expressing hostility to immigrants. The countries most accepting of minorities and 
immigrants are Columbia; 4.7 percent, Sweden; 3.5 percent, Argentina; 2.6 percent, and 
Uruguay; 1.7 percent. Of these nations, Azerbaijan, India, Uruguay, and Sweden are analyzed. 
Two additionally countries, the United Kingdom and Egypt, are also discussed due to their 
significant global impact.  
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 Beginning with one of the two nations on the forefront international media, Egypt’s 
recent relationship with referendums has been marred by political turmoil. The country has held 
six significant national referendums in the past twenty years through a revolution and a military 
coup. In 2005, the ruling president, Hosni Mubarak, called for a referendum on whether the 
office of presidency should be elected through direct elections instead of the previous method 
through the People’s Assembly. It was not the attempt to employ direct democracy that the 
opposition vilified but new strict requirements candidates would be required to meet to stand in 
presidential elections. A 2005 British Broadcasting Center found that turnout for the election was 
54 percent and 82 percent voted to approve the change. This referendum set the stage for the 
2011 Egyptian revolution which saw the resignation of Mubarak and the election of Mohamed 
Morsi. After President Morsi attempted to pass a referendum establishing an Islamic leaning 
government, the military ousted Morsi through a coup d'état led by the minister of defense, 
General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. 53 A recent 20 April, 2019 referendum called for a change to the 
four-year maximum term limits and seeks six-year terms instead.  
 It is important to note that Egypt’s demographic composition is particularly monoethnic. 
Over 99 percent of its population are of Egyptian ethnic decent according to the 2006 CIA World 
Fact Book. More recent demographics claim 95 percent Egyptian ethnicity with 4 percent Coptic 
identities. Despite this monoethnic identity, Egypt is particularly welcoming of migrants and 
refugees. Roughly 120,000 Syrian and up to one million Sudanese refugees reside within 
Egypt54. The Egyptian case enforces the notion that monoethnic cultures may be more accepting 
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to immigrants than those with more mixed compositions. It may also serve as a cautionary 
example of those seeking to establish political legitimacy through the incorporation of 
referendums. The use of referendums does not in itself create legitimacy.   
  
 The most prominent referendum being circulated by the media today is Brexit or the 
British Exit from the European Union. On June 23, 2016, Prime Minster David Cameron 
announced to the United Kingdom that the nation would hold a referendum on the fate of its 
relationship with the European Union. The major issues driving this decision were sovereignty, 
immigration, and trade. Specifically, the driving issues behind Brexit were immigration from 
eastern European bloc nations and their ability to obtain state welfare, net payments to the EU’s 
poorer nations, and an inability to negotiate trade terms outside of the Euro bloc. There was also 
the issue that the European Court of Human Rights continuously prevented deportation of 
foreign-born criminals. 55 
 The Brexit case study adds evidence to support the argument that referendums can 
produce inefficient outcomes, but another equally important concern is the implication Brexit 
may have on future policy influenced by populism. There is growing evidence to support the 
notion that populism is increasing around the world. The disapproval of government authority 
will always exist, but recent years have shown a growing distrust of “elites”. Matthijs Rooduijn 
explains that highly individualized societies produce more frequent populist leaders. 
Additionally, populist leaders tend to be elected more when a perception that leading political 
 







parties share similar ideologies. These examples, however, pale in comparison to 2016 research 
conducted by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart.  
 
Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash 
identified the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries and examined 
data collected from the 2002-2014 European Social Survey. Norris and Inglehart were able to 
identify consistent trends showing an increase in the amount of populist leaders. “Across Europe, 
as we will demonstrate, their [populist party] average share of the vote in national and European 
parliamentary elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from about 5.1 percent to 13.2 
percent at the expense of center parties”. There are two competing theories for why populism 
exists. The first is based on the belief that economic insecurity has caused backlash. The second 
is that a cultural backlash to progressivism is occurring. Modernization from the 20th century has 
created a range of social issues. According to the economic inequality theory, economic 
insecurity and growing inequality have led lower-strata society members who have not benefited 
from globalization to distrust traditional political parties. These citizens, it is believed, are “more 
susceptible to anti-establishment, nativist, and xenophobic scare-mongering”. The cultural 
backlash theory holds that previously politically dominant segments of society have recognized a 
decreasing trend in their political strength and are seeking to reestablish traditional power 
mechanics.   
 Stronger evidence exists supporting the cultural backlash theory. The European Social 
Survey result beliefs corresponded with the growth of populist parties. If the cultural backlash 
theory is correct there should be an increase in support of populist parties from older generations, 
white men, under educated, ethnic majorities, and those who are religious. Norris & Inglehart’s 
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results demonstrated a greater connection between these factors and populism than economic 
inequality alone. This theory can help explain why populism is on the rise globally. This type of 
analysis is especially useful because most scholars focus their study of populism too narrowly. 
“Nation-specific events such as these are proximate causes that help explain why things worked 
out as they did within a given country—but they do not explain why the vote for populist parties 
across many countries has roughly doubled in recent decades. By analyzing broad trends, a more 
compelling argument can be made for increasing trend of populism.  
Regardless of the cause of populist trends, Brexit has been the most prominent example 
of a referendum in recency. It showcased how complex, multi-issue policy decisions can result in 
contrary or undesirable results in accordance with Lacy & Niou. It also highlighted the 
importance of information campaigns during referendums in mobilizing support and the 
challenge of conveying complex information to numerous parties.   
Azerbaijan has had different challenges than the United Kingdom in its referendum use. 
It is the fourth most hostile nation in the study to immigrants and held a Constitutional 
amendment referendum in 2016. Of the 27 amendments proposed, 25 were passed with over 90 
percent approval and all were passed resoundingly. The amendments lengthened the presidential 
term limit from five to seven years and removed the age limit to become president. “A further 
proposal empowers the president to schedule an early presidential election and dissolve 
parliament if twice in one-year legislators pass no-confidence measures in the government or 
reject presidential nominees to key government posts”. 56  
 





Before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan 
comprised of over 15 significant ethnic groups. However, in the 2006 Census, it was reported 
that only 8.9 percent of the country consists of minority ethnic groups. 57 This drastic ethnic 
change highlights potential issues with referendum use. According to the European Commission 
against Racism, “In general, there is a lack of awareness on the part of the Azerbaijani 
population of the problem of racism and intolerance in Azerbaijan and of the relevant existing 
criminal, civil and administrative law provisions aimed at combating such phenomena”.  
The Azerbaijan case is challenging when considering referendum impacts on minority 
groups. Azerbaijan has exhibited a shift toward autocratic rule that conflict with the democratic 
nature of referendums. “Azerbaijan’s election commission ignored its own requirements by 
accepting the results of the September 26 referendum despite well-documented ballot stuffing, 
the detention of people protesting the procedures, and other serious irregularities,” said Robert 
Herman, vice president for Freedom Houses’ international programs. “The government showed 
its disregard for the fundamental rights of its citizens”. The 2016 referendum may have 
highlighted ethnic schisms, but the overall trend of voter fraud remains significantly more 
concerning. However, this examples demonstrates a nation with a troubled ethnic past (i.e. the 
ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh War) utilizing referendums to enhance exclusionary policies.     
 India is perhaps one of the most ethnically diverse nations on earth. The U.S. Department 
of State has written that over two thousand ethnic groups exist within the country. All major 
religions are represented as well as dozens of languages. Consequently, and as a result of the 






of data along ethnic lines. 58 Of the 4,000 Indians polled, over 47 percent were hostile to 
immigrants and minority groups. This hostility, however, may be more correlated with the small 
tribal and ethnic categories and castes in which Indians often associate than with national anti-
racial sentiments.  
 Only six referendums have been held in India through its post-colonial history. 59 The last 
was the 1967 referendum asking the province of Goa if they wanted to remain a Union territory 
or be merged with Maharashtra. Prior to the Goa, the decision of how to handle the territories of 
Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Junagadh existed. This referendum set the stage for future border 
disputes between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir territory. The consensus among Indian 
policy makers (and the Indian Constitution that prohibits referendum votes on policy issues) is 
that India cannot afford to implement referendums. It is believed the fractured ethno-religious 
and social caste differences among Indians today would be disastrous for stable policy. 60 
 One nation that has little trouble implementing referendums is Uruguay. It was one of the 
nations that reported remarkable acceptance to immigrant and minority groups with only 1.7 
percent of respondents expressing hostility to minority groups. The nation has three main ethnic 
groups. White is reported at 88 percent, Mestizo at 8 percent, and Black as 4 percent of the 
population. 61 It had a history of colonial rule from the Portuguese and British rule until 1830. 
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The nation has recently been democratically ruled since General Gregorio Álvarez relinquished 
control to civilian held elections in 1984. 62 
 
 Despite Uruguay’s complex political history, it has a track record for supporting labor 
and human rights. “According to the International Trade Union Confederation, Uruguay has 
become the most advanced country in the Americas in terms of respect for fundamental labour 
rights, in particular freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and the right to 
strike”. 63 The most notable aspect of Uruguay’s social history is that its racial composition 
remains relativity stable. Only 2.2 percent of its population consists of recent immigrants, 
roughly 77,000 of its 3.5-million-person population. Additionally, Uruguay has held 23 
referendums, since 1917. The most recent was a citizen launched initiative to move the criminal 
age of citizens from 18 to 16. 64 Very few referendums have been enacted in Uruguay despite 
Constitutional provisions allowing their use. A clear trend among Uruguay’s elections is that 
they appear to follow Lacy and Niou’s 1998 recommendation that referendums be limited to 
single-issue policy decisions. The majority of the 23 referendums have been relatively 
straightforward questions despite their national impact.  
The Swedish government, like India, does not collect official statistics on ethnicity. The 
2017 CIA World Factbook has categorized Swedish ethnic groups to 81.5 percent Swedish, 1.7 
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percent Syrian, 1.4 percent Iraqi, 1.5 percent Finish, and 13.9 percent other (primarily nomadic 
ethnic groups in the norther regions of the country). The ethnic/cultural differences are minimal 
between Swedish-Finns along border areas and a significant portion of the population is the 
result of acceptance of Middle Eastern immigrants. Sweden incorporated aspects of social 
democracy into its political institutions well before the 20th century. However, its entire recorded 
history began roughly after 1,000 A.D. with the recession of the polar ice caps. After a short 
foray with Imperial pursuits, Sweden withdrew and maintained a relatively neutral stance toward 
political dynamics in the European continent65. Consequently, its political climate has lacked the 
turmoil witnessed in older, warmer regions.  
Only six national referendums have been held in Swedish history. The first was the 
rejection of alcohol prohibition, the second involved voting to continue driving on the right side 
of the road, the third was for a tax funded pension system, the fourth was to reject nuclear power 
as a viable energy source, the fifth was to join the European Union, and the sixth established the 
Euro as the national currency. 66 Each of these referendums, save for entrance to the European 
Union, had simple questions and simple ramifications. Sweden, as it has already been mentioned, 
has a monoethnic demographic. Sweden adds credence to the belief that monoethnic nations are 
more likely to profess acceptance of minorities than those who are more diverse.  
These case studies provide interesting context to the incorporation of referendums. The 
nations in this study that used referendums the most were those in a transitory state from 
autocratic to more democratic rule. Nations with a long history of democratic rule appear to use 
 







referendums less frequently and those referendums tend to be focused on single policy issues. 
Most referendum case studies have focused on nations that have a long history of use. An 
equally important area of study could be research conducted on nations with emerging 
referendum use. Such research could resolve the question of whether nations forgo referendum 
use because they fear the impact of direct democracy or if nations see improvement in public 
attitudes toward inclusivity when they incorporate referendums in governance.  
Research on referendums is thorough and voluminous. However, little energy has been 
devoted toward differentiating the types of referendums and the subsequent impact each might 
have on a polity. This chapter scratches the surface of this endeavor by identifying modest 
corollary relationships between referendums and social attitudes toward minorities and 
immigrants. Through several case studies, additional trends have been identified. Monoethnic 
groups appear to be more accepting to immigrants, referendum use alone does not legitimize 
outcome, and a contentious relationship exists between referendums and populist tendencies. 
Future research should engage in more robust statistical analysis of specific referendums as well 
as isolate variables in outlier nations that cause extreme variation in minority acceptance from 



























































It should seem intuitive that structural mechanisms involved in an election process can 
affect the happiness of voters. What is less intuitive is the extent of the impact each type of 
election process may have on the happiness of the electorate. This leads to the discussion of what 
components are most desired. What is an ideal voting system in a representative democracy? 
Which system might provide the greatest happiness? These philosophical normative follow-up 
questions are challenging to address due to their intangible nature but deserve as much attention 
as quantitative research endeavors.  
 Before going further, happiness must be discussed. Like democracy, happiness is one of 
the more subjective political concepts. Skeptics might ask if political systems and happiness are 
related to the extent that they can be measured or if a link should be sought at all. But consider 
one of the most powerful documents in American political government on the topic -- The 
Declaration of Independence. It proclaims, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The pursuit of happiness was 
considered a fundamental human right by thinkers of the Enlightenment and by many scholars 
today. I ask what political structures do the most to achieve this aim.  
This chapter tackles the topic of voting systems around the world with a utilitarian based 
perspective. It deviates from other ethical philosophies in that it intentionally avoids a normative 
“ought to” approach. It also remains silent on multi-party systems. I do this because the United 
States uses winner-take-all elections and I want to discover an improved winner-take-all election 
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system as an alternative. It is not my desire to demonstrate the most desirable model based on 
broad, universally accepted axioms, but to go straight to the topic of happiness itself. It is my 
belief that excessive energy has been devoted to the theoretical concepts of axiom violation and 
not enough to the impact a voting system has on the electorate.  
 Because of the intangible nature of happiness, this endeavor largely rests upon how 
happiness is defined. In this case, I have used the Global Happiness Organization’s metric. The 
index produced by the organization encompasses per capita GDP, social support services, life 
expectancy at birth, freedom to make life choices, generosity, and perceptions of corruption. 
Some might not appreciate such an explicit definition and instead prefer more open-ended 
concepts, but the Global Happiness 2017 study found that three quarters of global national 
deviations between their data came from these categories – a fact that cannot be ignored.67 This 
variation is why I selected this index to define happiness. An all-encompassing definition of 
happiness weakens its ability to discern direct causal links between voting systems and more 
defined elements of happiness. The benefit to this approach, however, is that it establishes a 
framework for evaluating future voting systems and utilizes widely available national election 
data. It also provides a roadmap to focus future correlation studies. Happiness is the answer. The 
question is, what factors affect happiness the most and which systems are the most conducive to 
the answer? 
Why use a utility-based approach? It can be problematic to focus on utility too narrowly. 
After all, the Paradox of Voting, where the act of voting appears irrational arrives when using 
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utilitarianism too narrowly.68 But this paper does not focus on specific issues that arise when 
using this approach. Instead, it uses the overarching concept of being able to quantify happiness 
as a metric on a methodological basis. Skeptics of utilitarianism believe it is ill-suited to solve 
social issues. My response to this criticism is that I agree that utility models alone are insufficient 
for policy making. But when coupled with traditional success metrics, (such as PPC GDP or life 
expectancy), these models are the best tools for problem solving. I define utility as a quantifiable 
measure of happiness from maximum to none and express it as a percentage.   
While my approach is not axiomatic, it is still important to provide a theoretical 
framework for what might lead to greater happiness and demonstrate where most of the 
discussion has revolved. It is theorized that electorates are happier when they have political 
institutions that guarantee universal rights, provide competitive and transparent elections, are 
represented based on belief of consent of the governed, and allow participation in elections.6970 
Democracies with these components likely contain happier voters.  
Using a structural overview of voting systems leads to a more sound, long-term approach 
to voting system selection but “much of the literature on voting theory (and, more generally, 
social choice theory) is focused on so-called axiomatic characterization results”.71 Regardless, it 
is necessary to understand these axioms even with a happiness focused approach. While Ideal 
voting criteria are open to debate, there are several criteria that are commonly accepted in three 
or more-person elections. These axioms are believed to be necessary for any multi-candidate 
election system:  unrestricted domain, unrestricted range, always a winner, the Condorcet Win 
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Criterion, independence of irrelevant alternatives, non-dictatorship, majority rule, and 
monotonicity.72 It is largely accepted that whatever voting system a political body chooses to 
implement, an ideal voting criterion will be violated. To better understand the imperative of 
relaxing a certain criterion and resulting implications to the electorate, it is necessary to 
understand exactly what each means to any system.  
Non-dictatorship is likely the most important axiom for the existence of democracy. 
Democracy and dictatorship are, by definition, incompatible. The criterion specifies that no one 
voter can or should be able to determine the outcome of the election. This axiom can be paired 
with the always a winner criterion due to its near self-evident nature. Always having a winner as 
a criterion seems like an obvious choice to include in a voting system but some methods, like the 
Condorcet Method, can produce indeterminate results. Despite its mathematical soundness, 
Condorcet elections can result in paradoxes where “circular” elections occur such that: A > B > 
C > A. The ineffectiveness and instability such a failure would create is largely agreed to be 
undesirable. Of all the criterion, these two are the least controversial. They are believed to be 
fundamental to any democratic voting system.  
The Condorcet Win Criterion is a condition where a candidate would always win when 
placed in a one on one match up with another candidate.73 A voting system meets this criterion if 
the winner would also beat every other candidate in a one on one face-off. This concept is 
incredibly compelling and arguably creates the most mathematically sound voting system. The 
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issue with this process is that elections conducted in this manner tend to violate the concept of 
always producing a clear winner.  
Proponents of alternative voting systems are more effective at persuasion when they 
convince citizens their models comply with the “fairness” aspect of Condorcet Winners without 
the same indeterministic outcomes. It is also believed that strategic voting in a Condorcet 
Method might lead to vote burying – a method of falsely voting in an opposition front runner that 
is less desirable. This type of strategic voting would lead to more common indeterminate results 
and other systems would be required to find resolution.74 Some scholars assert that systems 
like instant run-off voting elect the true Condorcet Winner most of the time. When it comes to 
vote burying, systems like instant run-off elections may, “ironically, elect true Condorcet 
Winners more often than Condorcet processes alone.”75 This criterion is also heavily tied to the 
concept of majority rule since the definition of Condorcet Winner is the winner of a binary 
election in one on one match ups. If the voting system satisfies the Condorcet Criterion, then the 
majority candidate must be the winner. This says that the candidate who has more than 50 
percent of 1st-place votes is the winner”.76  
Conforming with the independence of irrelevant alternative axiom means that adding 
additional candidates that appear like a voter’s ideal choice would not cause the primary 
candidate to lose. This failure is seen in current plurality voting systems where similar third-
party candidates “steal” votes from comparable candidates. This leads to less preferred 
candidates winning the election. The desire of electorates to obtain systems that meet the 
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independence of irrelevant alternatives is clear. There is an expansive amount of public opinion 
articles on desire to vote for third parties. Op Ed articles from contributors like Adam Ulbricht 
have declared statements such as, “I don’t know about you, but I’m tired of the status quo. I’ve 
finally had enough of picking the lesser of two evils, recognizing that you’re still picking evil”.77 
This sentiment is common in locations with plurality elections and demonstrates clear awareness 
of this axiom’s issues.  
The axiom of majority rule states that if a candidate is preferred by over 51 percent of 
candidates, then that candidate should win. This is a surprisingly contested axiom. Majority rule 
is thought to be vital to the health of any democracy, but some systems focus on magnitude of 
desire rather than binary output.78 This is a central argument of utilitarian rather than 
majoritarian thought. A utilitarian election process might allow a plurality loser to win an 
election given the overall feeling of the electorate. For example, only 39 percent of the 
population may have voted for a candidate over another who received 40 percent first place 
votes. A system that allows for votes along a range might permit the electorate to express 
stronger overall desire for the candidate who received less first-place votes but also happens to 
be amenable to a greater number of voters. This axiom may appear to violate traditional notions 
of democracy, but would likely be more expressive. 
Monotonicity is an axiom stating that ranking a preferred candidate better should not 
cause them to lose and ranking them lower should not cause them to win. This seems intuitive, 
but it is possible to violate in instant-runoff elections where voters are aware that their candidate 
does not have a majority of votes in the first round and will likely lose a second round. By voting 
 
77Ulbricht, Adam. "It's time to vote third party." USA Today. November 07, 2016. Accessed December 4, 2017. 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/07/s-time-vote-third-party/93306900/. 
78 "Majority Rule/Minority Rights: Essential Principles." Majority Rule/Minority Rights: Essential Principles | 
Democracy Web. Accessed December 5, 2017. http://democracyweb.org/majority-rule-principles. 
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strategically (voting their candidate down to help a weaker candidate) these voters can force the 
elimination of the biggest threat in the first round to defeat a weaker candidate in the second 
round. This type of strategic action in ranked voting systems is what I believe to be their greatest 
weakness. Elections with high instances of strategic votes might mirror similar levels of 
dissatisfaction as plurality systems.  
Majority rule and monotonicity are the two criteria that I theorize to be the least 
necessary for a healthy democracy of the axioms presented. Crispin Allard, a member of the 
counsel for Electoral Reform Society, has argued, based on a mathematical model that the 
probability of monotonicity failure actually changing the result of an election for any 
given constituency would be 1 in 4000; however, Lepelley found a probability of 397/6912 = 
5.74 percent for 3-candidate elections.79 What this means is that election systems such as ranked 
or instant-runoff elections might violate monotonicity, elect the incorrect candidate or have a 
failure rate of six percent in a worst-case scenario. This might seem high and it certainly is. It 
would mean these systems would have failure rates of one in every sixteen elections, but it 
should not be forgotten that researchers like Dr. Warren Smith believe failure rates of current 
plurality systems to be approximately one in eight which is more than double the six percent 
figure.80 
These axioms are the most commonly theorized requirements for an ideal voting system. 
Kenneth Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem demonstrated that “when voters have three or 
more distinct alternatives (options), no ranked voting electoral system can convert the ranked 
preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also 
 
79 Lepelley, Dominique, Frédéric Chantreuil, and Sven Berg. "The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off 
elections." Mathematical Social Sciences 31, no. 3 (1996): 133-46. doi:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00804-7. 
80 Smith, Warren D. "Ants, Bees, and Computers agree Range Voting is best single-winner system." April 24, 2007. 
Accessed November 1, 2017. http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/naturebees.pdf. 
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meeting a specified set of criteria: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto 
efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives “.81 Additionally, the “Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem shows that any meaningful ranked voting system is susceptible to tactical 
voting or manipulation of voting schemes".82 Because of these conclusions, research to date has 
focused on which criteria to relax to advocate alternative voting systems.  
A different way to think about the failure of elections and how important it is to take 
corrective action is to think of the failures like a compounding inefficiency tax. Taxes, while 
necessary for governance, create inefficiencies in markets. Correcting these inefficiencies has the 
potential to create unforeseen dividends.  
 
Suppose, thanks to a poor voting method, our elections 5 percent of the time make avoidable bad 
decisions. That has an effect analogous to a 5 percent tax on society. Unlike a real tax, though, this 
tax does not get used for any useful purpose, it just gets wasted…. Over time, that 5 percent keeps 
adding up and up. After a century of annual compounding, 5 percent interest would represent a 
multiplicative factor of 132. That is, your country, by the trivially easy move of adopting (versus not 
adopting) a better voting method, would under this estimate be one hundred and thirty two times 
richer. If however this 5 percent bad-decision rate were only equivalent to a 1 percent tax, then we'd 
only get 2.7 times richer. Either way, this is a massive improvement for very little effort.83 
 
Thinking of election inefficiencies in this manner demonstrate how serious an inefficiency can 
be overtime. Time can compound more than just money. 
A key argument against the stringent use of majority rule is that it doesn’t discriminate 
desire. Current, single-winner elections are binary. The candidates either receive “yes” or a “no” 
but a non-binary based system could show how strongly a candidate is preferred. Smith critiques 
binary systems by stating, “The answer is that voter majorities (and the Cordorcet winner CW) 
can be wrong! If 51 percent of the voters think A is better by 1 utility unit, while 49 percent think 
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B is better by 97 utility units, then majority vote will elect the wrong candidate: A.”84 This type 
of system is used by companies like Netflix and Amazon where voters are permitted unlimited 
amounts of votes and discriminate scores. Products sold by these companies are then given 
aggregate scores that provide greater accuracy. This practice is susceptible to extreme forms of 
strategic voting, but better products typically have higher scores. The process also assumes a 
large enough sample of voters exists. This type of voting is arguably one of the more efficient 
types of winner-take-all voting processes.  
Knowing the axiomatic affects involved in voting systems should direct research but that 
alone is insufficient without a review of the most prominent voting systems and their 
alternatives. Currently, the United States employs first past the post or plurality voting for its 
national elections. It’s simple and easy to understand. Only one candidate can win and a single 
candidate is elected. Each voter has one vote and that vote can only go to one candidate. The 
drawbacks to first past the post systems are that it can result in the winner taking a plurality vote 
instead of a majority (> 50 percent), it results in a strategic voting (choosing the least preferred 
candidate in this case rather than a preferred candidate), and is susceptible to the third-party 
spoiler effect – also known as violating independence of irrelevant Aalternatives.  Plurality 
voting creates a competitive election process where the winner should win by large margin, but 
this fact is negated using the electoral college.85 These conflicting tensions may lead political 
scholars to suggest an alternative voting system that resolves the tension. The most promising 
alternatives to plurality voting that meet most axiomatic criteria are approval, range, and ranked 
choice/instant-runoff voting.  
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Approval voting is a winner-take-all voting process that places no restrictions on the 
number of votes given. The winner is the candidate with the most votes. This type of process is 
more expressive, removes the spoiler effect, removes the benefit of strategically voting against a 
favored candidate, is simpler to understand than more complex systems, and tends to produce a 
Condorcet Winner.86 More expressive systems can be valuable for maintaining a healthy amount 
of competition. Parties believed to have little to no support often fail to grow. A more accurate 
public representation of a party’s status (popularity) is valuable with approval systems.87 It may 
seem paradoxical but implementing this type of system may benefit both major and minor 
parties. By removing the spoiler effect, large parties need not fear third party candidates 
“stealing” votes. Voters can also support and grow lesser parties without the fear of benefiting 
their less desired candidates.88 
Range voting is also a winner-take-all voting process. It almost exactly mirrors approval 
voting but allows voters the opportunity to discriminate desire. Instead of a binary 0 or 1 for as 
many candidates as they wish, voters are given a predetermined range to choose. Each candidate 
can be given a different value based on how strongly they desire the candidate. Voters that don’t 
put any number for a candidate would not affect that candidate’s score and a predetermined 
minimum number of votes would be needed for a candidate to achieve victory to prevent 
unknown candidates from winning. This type of system carries all the benefits of approval voting 
 
86 "Approval Voting." The Center for Election Science. November 03, 2017. http://www.electology.org/approval-
voting. 
87 Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, and Ðura-Georg Granić. "Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany." 
SpringerLink. June 11, 2011. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00355-011-0550-5. 
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systems but goes further by allowing voters to express magnitude of desire. However, opponents 
of range voting have questioned its constitutionality. 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court made the “one person one vote” rule explicit in Reynolds v. Sims (377 
U.S. 533- 1964). The rule stated that no vote should count more than any other so that it has 
unequal weight. This unequal weight would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution. And it was Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) that extended the Equal Protection Clause 
to districting issues. In Reynolds, the state of Alabama set up its districts so that they varied 
wildly in population. The districting was so bad that it gave some voters’ ballots as much as 41 
times more weight than others. Because the weights of the ballots were different between 
districts, that violated the “one person one vote” rule.89 
 
 
The key response to this decision is that all voters have opportunity of access to equal political 
representation – not necessarily that each vote needs to match one representative. The advocates 
at the Range Voting Organization have gone as far as to argue the founding fathers personally 
knew Condorcet and appreciated his political ideas. This is why, they postulate, the Constitution 
itself is agnostic on which type of voting system Americans should use.90 
Utilitarian voting systems often fail the majority rule criteria. A different way to view this 
argued weakness is by viewing these systems as maximizing overall happiness at the expense of 
potential plurality dissatisfaction. The largest issue with such a system is its violation of binary 
majoritarian rule. It is unlikely that such systems will see widespread public support without 
existing models to emulate.  
 The third major alternative to plurality voting is ranked voting with single-transferable 
votes. This system is more complex than the two mentioned in its implementation. Voters rank 
all the available candidates. The votes are tallied, and the loser is eliminated. All voters that had 
chosen that candidate have their number two vote become their number one vote until a majority 
winner is chosen. The benefit to this system is that it more accurately reflects the will of the 
 




electorate. It also eliminates the spoiler effect that is so derided in plurality systems. 
Additionally, it is used in cities across the United States like Minneapolis, St. Paul, San 
Francisco, Cambridge, and Tacoma Park, Maryland. The downside to such a system is the 
complexity of conducting multiple vote counting interactions. The elimination process 
complicates the election and can potentially cast doubts on result legitimacy.  
 
 The two most promising voting systems are approval and range voting with 
ranked/instant-runoff being a close third. The Range Voting Center recommends approval voting 
“in situations where simplicity and speed are paramount” and range voting where the highest 
accuracy is desired. It should also be noted that the American Mathematical Society and 
American Statistical Association, use approval voting to elect officers. 91  
Since 2012, the Global Happiness Organization has published the World Happiness Index 
Report to promote global happiness using utilitarian ethics. They have isolated the six most 
significant variables responsible for worldwide happiness variation.92 The report encompasses up 
to 105 nations around the world. I created geographic groupings from these nations to minimize 
the impact of cultural variation. It is not difficult to contrast the differences between nations on 
differing continents. Demonstrating differences between Ethiopia and Canada might do little to 
convince skeptics that election systems are the reason Ethiopians are less happy than Canadians. 
However, comparing nations that are collocated and have similar cultural/historical heritage 
creates far more credible results. Differences in happiness with culturally similar countries could 
very well be explained by election systems. This type of comparative analysis is used often by 
 
91 Gurstelle, William. "The Way We Vote Is Terrible. Here's Why." Popular Mechanics. November 14, 2017. 
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researchers studying topics with variables not easily isolated. The goal is to minimize the 
variables to the max extent possible. 
   The groups I created are North America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe, the Nordic States, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The groupings are not all inclusive 
and only contain nations within the World Happiness Report.  
 
 
Figure 4.  
National Happiness Indexes 
 
Data Cell groupings: 
North America   Variance Average 
USA (plurality) 6.993 0.136866333 6.962333333 
Canada (plurality) 7.316     
Mexico (plurality) 6.578     
 
Nordic   Variance Average 
Sweden (party list) 7.284 0.011968917 7.44475 
Denmark (party list) 7.522     
Finland (party list) 7.469     
Iceland (plurality) 7.504     
 
South America   Variance Average (party list) 
Argentina (party list 6.599 0.143490268 6.192888889 
Bolivia (party list) 5.823   Average (plurality) 
Chili (party list) 6.652   5.3715 
Brazil (party list) 6.635     
Columbia (party list) 6.357     
Ecuador (party list) 6.008     
Peru (party list) 5.715     
Venezuela (plurality) 5.25     
Uruguay (party list) 6.454     









Africa   Variance Average (party list) 
Algeria (party list) 5.872 0.2640372 5.1532 
Libya (party list) 5.525   Average (plurality) 
Nigeria (plurality) 5.074   4.8915 
Somalia (IRV) 5.151     
Sierra Leone (plurality) 4.709     
South Africa (party list) 4.829     
Tunisia (party list) 4.805     
Egypt (party list) 4.735     
 
Western Europe   Variance Average Party List 
France (party list) 6.442 0.163023333 6.44 
Germany (party list) 6.951   Plurality 
Italy (party list) 5.964   6.714 
Spain (party list) 6.403     
United Kingdom (plurality) 6.714     
 
 
Eastern Europe   Variance Average (party list) 
Ukraine (party list) NA 0.225404818 5.784272727 
Hungary (party list) 5.324   Plurality 
Poland (plurality) 5.973    5.182 
Estonia (party list) 5.611     
Latvia (party list) 5.85     
Lithuania (two round parallel)  5.902     
Slovakia (party list) 6.098     
Russia (party list) 5.963     
Slovenia (party list) 5.758     
Romania (party list) 5.825     
Czech Rep (party list) 6.609     
Bosnia (plurality) 5.182     
Bulgaria (party list) 4.714     
 
Middle East   Variance Average 
Turkey (party list) 5.5 0.200970167 6.149166667 
Bahrain (monarch) 6.087    Party List Average 
Kuwait (monarchy) 6.105    6.3565 
Jordan (monarchy) 5.336     
UAE (monarchy) 6.648     
Qatar (monarchy) 6.375     
Saudi Arabia (monarchy) 6.344     
Israel (party list) 7.213     
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Asia   
Variance 
plurality Average plurality 
China (communist) 5.273 0.0920288 6.21 





Malaysia (plurality) 6.084 0.0198005 5.1735 
Singapore (plurality) 6.572     
South Korea (plurality) 5.838     
Taiwan (plurality) 6.422     
Thailand (plurality) 6.424     












The more powerful data involves geographic regions where political variation exists. 
North America and the Nordic States lack sufficient political diversity to identify the utility in 
different political systems. Regions like Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Asia are 
noteworthy. The Africa group shows a slightly higher happiness score in multi-party systems 
than plurality. This is seen on a much greater scale with the South America groupings with the 
6.19 to 5.37 scores. There is an argument to be made that the Middle Eastern bloc lacks 
sufficient political data points to use in the conversation regarding elections. However, it is 
notable that the two nations democratic in nature have a greater average happiness scores than 
the oil rich Middle Eastern kingdoms. This may be more the result of the impact of climate on 
happiness over wealth. Further inquiry could determine the significance of climate and wealth on 
national happiness. Asia demonstrates the stark contrast between plurality and communist 
systems in terms of happiness. It should be noted that the overall average of plurality systems 
produces a score marginally higher than multi-party nations. This may be more a result of a 
greater number of nations (33 compared to 17) in the multi-party average than the plurality 
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average. This data weakly suggests that, when compared to other nations in geographic 
proximity, multi-party systems elicit greater happiness in the electorate.  
 Correlations can be observed when different notions of happiness begin to point in the 
same direction. The happiness metric may be redefined to encompass topics contained within the 
Happiness Index such as longevity and wellbeing metrics, or even variables not contained within 
the index such as public opinion polls on government transparency or trust. A powerful 
indication might emerge if a select few systems begin to produce similar results. The goal is to 
determine if electorates that are more adequately represented are happier than those who are not.  
While the variables measured in this chapter appear weakly, if at all, correlated, this is 
not to say future iterations of this methodology with different variables will produce similar 
results. Different Happiness Index elements could be isolated in future studies to see if stronger 
relationships exist between sole elements and election processes. Happiness could also be 
redefined completely in future studies. When multiple indexes indicate similar empirical results 
after changes to the indexes are made a powerful conclusion can be drawn despite the qualitative 
nature of the methodology. Multi-party systems appear marginally superior to plurality/winner-
take-all systems based on the metric used. Election based systems appear superior to monarchical 
and communistic systems as well.  Insufficient real-world data exists to detect correlations in 
voting systems like the Borda Count and Condorcet elections but that may not always remain the 
case.  
It is largely accepted that no system fits the bill as perfect by any definition, but that does 
voters little good. What should be asked next is how can alternatives be found given they remain 
theoretical? In many decision-filled environments, a commonly used strategy to problem solving 
is to apply conditional probability, or Bayes’ Theorem, to determine the maximum payoff of any 
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given process. Bayes’ Theorem is simple in concept; it is the probability of an action occurring 
multiplied by the instances it could occur and is influenced by prior events.93 This widespread 
theorem is useful in situations where concrete data are available, making it a useful utilitarian 
tool.  
According to researchers like Dr. Warren Smith, voting research has made little progress 
to date. “Previously the area of voting systems lay under the dark cloud of ‘impossibility 
theorems’ showing that no voting system can satisfy certain seemingly reasonable sets of 
axioms.”94 Many studies have developed inconclusive results or remained purely in the 
theoretical. Dr. Smith developed a promising mathematical model based off probability 
outcomes to determine which single candidate elections might elicit the greatest amount of 
happiness in the electorate. Bayesian Regret or Voter Satisfaction Efficiency is an attempt to 
measure the “happiness” a voting system might produce. “The ‘Bayesian regret’ of a voting 
system is just the (nonnegative) expected difference between the utility (summed over all voters) 
of the election winner that system produces, versus the maximum-possible (summed) utility 
which would have resulted had the best candidate always won”.95 
In his model, Dr. Smith assigned randomly generated utilities prefaced on election 
outcomes. He then used Monte Carlo (a random number generation process) computer 
simulations to run 720 simulations with millions of iterations. The result is an index that appears 
to capture what the most optimal voting system might be based on maximum revealed utility 
with utility being defined as a numerical percentage on a sliding scale.  
 
93 Routledge, Richard. "Bayes's theorem." Encyclopædia Britannica. February 20, 2017. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bayess-theorem. 






 Simulations such as this are excellent at forcing revealed preferences. They can show 
which voting system might yield the most utility even with widespread strategic voting.  Such 
models can be criticized for their cardinal nature. Can voters really assign a specific number to a 
candidate? “Models simulated may be unrealistic… But the parameters of the simulations can be 
altered getting coverage of a wide space of possibilities, at least some of which are likely to be 
realistic – so that if (as will occur here) all the models agree on some conclusion, that is very 
strong evidence for it”.96 It is also attractive to measure a model without relying on subjectivity. 
When polled, citizens might be able to provide slight preferences but not quantified numerical 
values. Such defined stratification is rare in social sciences. 
Voter Satisfaction Efficiency and similar computer models may be the future of 
theoretical problem solving and system analysis. The Vote Satisfaction Efficiency index is used 
in William Poundstone’s book Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can 
Do About It) as well as in academic publications like Sebastien Bubeck and Che-Yu Liu in their 
study Prior-free and prior-dependent regret bounds for Thompson Sampling.97  Men like 
Maruice Conti believe computer algorithms have the potential to solve near any efficiency 
problem and can be witness by viewing his speech on Artificial Intelligence.98  While computer 
algorithms hold great promise, there is much to be learned from conducting organic research on 
animals that engage in similar behavior. 
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A 2007 paper titled Ants, Bees, and Computers agree Range Voting is the best single-
winner system, by Dr. Smith, asserts that there are three ways to “make a quantitative evaluation” 
on varying voting systems.  
 
The first is to examine actual elections throughout history, try to determine which results would 
have happened under different voting systems and how ‘good’ each would have been. This is a 
variation of what this chapter attempts to do. The second would be to conduct elections via 
computer simulation as has just been explained in depth. The last would be to “create some 
eusocial lifeform which, as an important part of its lifecycle, holds a single-winner election, and 
such that the choice made by that election has a major effect on Darwinian fitness. Let it evolve 
on some planet for 100 Myr while conducting over 1015 elections – then see what voting 
procedure was invented and how well it performs… This experiment has already been done by 
honeybees and ants on Earth.99  
 
 
This type of associative problem solving can be conducted on natural organisms if a 
realistic association can be identified. Every season bees must find a new hive. The survival of 
the swarm depends on the location found. Scout bees search for a location, return to the hive, and 
conduct a dance that 1. express a vote, and 2. express how strongly the bee feels about its vote 
based on the duration and energy of its dance. These types of natural occurrences can be useful 
especially when searching for alternative election systems within the political realm.  
The academic debate regarding election systems is not focused on whether it would be 
prudent to keep plurality systems in place but rather, which system should replace plurality 
elections. It would be difficult to argue that political representation has no effect on the 
happiness of an electorate. It is equally challenging to profess that a direct causal link can be 
established between happiness and national election systems as has been attempted. The  
different forms of single-winner election systems undeniably affect the six variables contained 
with the World Happiness Report Index, but their effect on happiness is likely tangential. Future 
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studies should continue to focus on happiness as an outcome. Definitions may differ, but 
consensus of any sort is powerful. There is likely no silver bullet election system immediately 
available but there remains room for improvement.  
 Institutional political change occurs slowly for good reason. Rapid revolutions make it 
difficult to establish long-standing norms possessed by more stable systems. I foresee election 
system reform occurring piecemeal. Cities and localities are prime targets to test alternative 
processes. Reform that unambiguously benefits citizens should spread rapidly. Institutions like 
the Range Voting Organization and Electoral Reform Society that educate the electorate are 
conducting the first steps to reform. Adoption of such alternatives on smaller scales would be the 
next step in introducing potential alternatives. The final steps would involve nation-wide 
adoption of policies after a significant establishment already exists at the local level.  
 The future of election study is promising. Between associative analysis conducted in this 
chapter, computer simulations, and studying nature, there exists a strong chance for the discovery 
of election methods that lead to greater happiness. Two key areas still in need of research are 
greater insight into the relationship between types of governments and the bellicosity expressed 
by their citizens and which types of governments are most efficient at delivering services to 
citizens. This chapter can be used as a roadmap for more in-depth causal analysis. It also presents 
a synthesized compilation of the on-going academic discussion and has introduced promising 
methods of future election system analysis. These contributions should facilitate future election-












There’s a common phrase in the English language used to discourage tweaking systems. 
“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. The problem, however, is that representation in the United States 
is broken, at least to an extent. Some systems can be manipulated endlessly with little 
repercussion. Political systems are not so forgiving. At best, populations experience significant 
frustration to a poorly implemented change. At worst, millions die. Despite this grave possibility, 
failing to correct representation issues in republics can be equally disastrous.  
Special interest groups and the onset of gerrymandering bypass natural governmental 
checks and balances. These entities exist outside government but have significant impact on the 
political process. Referendums might appear to be an excellent solution to representation issues, 
but they create a host of issues as well. Voters cannot adequately strategically vote or vote trade 
even with modern technological innovations. Referendums can severely restrict the rights of 
minorities when they focus on political representation. Lastly, first past the post voting has 
remained in place for over 240 years. It was the best option for the burgeoning republic because 
of its logistical appeal but not because it was the most representative.  
In the case of anything political, skeptics are wary of political policy prescriptions. 
Failing to openly admit to a clear vision or end state often places prescriptions at severe 
disadvantage to criticism. This thesis and the prescriptions contained within aim to mollify the 
impact of plurality groups in American politics. It also attempts to address growing concerns that 
voter disinterest is damaging the polity. By rectifying this representation issue, it is hoped that 
voter participation increases. By explaining that referendums are not the solution to this issue, it 
is hoped that policy makers can avoid the same pitfalls befallen to other republics. By altering 
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the way elections are decided, it is hoped that campaigns will be more civil, less vitriolic, and 
more competitive. And lastly, changes to the voting system should enhance representative 
responsiveness in previously unresponsive districts as well as signal a clear strength of mandate 
to political candidates. Winning alone will not be the end all be all of politics.  
These hopes arise from a desire to see more diverse involvement in the American 
political process. It is hoped that partisanship be weakened through a process that allows 
multiple candidates to run without harming clear frontrunners. Existing political parties will 
undoubtedly discourage such changes. But it should be noted these structural changes would not 
necessarily change the current political dynamic. They merely offer to structurally allow such 
changes should they be sought.  
The state of Maine has been the first to make alterations to its election process. By 
introducing ranked choice voting, the state allowed a candidate that would have lost in a single 
election plurality to win after neither candidate garnered 51 percent of the vote. Bruce Poliquin 
eventually dropped his legal challenge of the new system after an emphatic defense of the 
process was released by the Maine State Supreme Court.100 It’s likely future court cases will be 
levied as election systems are changed. In the case of politics, outcome often matters more to 
candidates than process.  
This thesis has shown special interest groups can significantly impact the political 
process. It also showed that gerrymandering reduces voter turnout but can be alleviated with the 
introduction of an efficiency gap calculation and turn based districting approach. It demonstrated 
that referendums can still be useful despite their inherent inefficiencies and should be used 
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differently depending on the cultural content of the citizenry. It has emphatically argued that 
changing election methods in the United States promises to alleviate a fundamental issue of 
inadequate voter representation. Despite these results, little attention has been paid to a way 
forward. Implementing the changes previously recommended will take much more thought and 
its undeniable that unforeseen challenges will arise during implementation.  
 Political changes either occur glacially or with great leaps forward. The leaps are usually 
predicated by some national or global disaster. It is hoped that disaster not be the catalyst for 
change in this case. Consequently, federalism and patience are the most likely allies in making 
political change across the United States. In the case of gerrymandering, extra political energy 
will need to be exerted to overturn recent roadblocks. On 27, June 2019 the Supreme Court in 
Rucho v. Common Cause, declared partisan gerrymandering is not reviewable by federal courts. 
101  
There is a fear and misunderstanding at the highest level of the judiciary that no 
corrective mechanisms exist to address gerrymandering. Of course, not all gerrymandering can 
be corrected. It is, at its heart, a political question. But the legislative bodies throughout the states 
can offer the courts a toolkit to evaluate gerrymandering more effectively. Safe seats will always 
exist in some locations – drawing competitive districts would lead to absurd boundaries in those 
areas. Despite this reality, gerrymandering is a question that the courts are aptly equipped to 
address.  
 





The Courts have readily shown their ability to intervene when racially based 
gerrymandering is discovered. Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964) demonstrated 
that districts decided by race would be incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment and 
established the doctrine of “one person, one vote”. 102 The Amendment does not protect parties, 
but these cases showed the court is capable of intervening when gerrymandering occurs. If the 
courts aren’t the only solution other options must be sought. When seeking solutions to 
inadequate representation, a common argument is to incorporate referendums. 
 Referendums have undoubtedly been useful at correcting legislative inefficiencies, but 
they are not the silver bullet needed to address widespread representation issues. When policy 
questions are complex and involve numerous implications beyond single-issue topics, it is often 
best to leave the legislature to the topic. Some states have placed limitations on the frequency of 
referendums to allow time for their impact to be felt and analyzed. Referendums may not be the 
sole solution to representation issues, but they certainly increase political participation. In one 
study, the Initiative and Referendum League of Maine noted that participation increases 3-8 
percent in elections including referendums. 103  
When majorities make decisions there are often second and third order effects that can 
hamper political access of minority groups. Sylvia Vargas explained how insidious referendums 
can be when political access is at stake. Along the same lines, this thesis analyzed public 
attitudes toward minority groups and found nations incorporating different types of referendums 
had distinctly different mindsets toward minority groups. Such a conclusion alone might not be 
significant, but a similar study conducted across U.S. states could reveal which referendums are 
 





most suited for certain regions. Such a regional strategy would also be the way forward for 
election reform. 
Surprisingly, the marijuana legalization movement may be the best model for election 
change in the United States. The history of cannabis in the U.S. is complex. It was ubiquitous 
and growth was even legally mandated in some early colonies. It was not until the Twenty First 
Amendment that marijuana was widely criminalized. 104 Significant concern exists regarding its 
impact on crime and the health of the public. Despite this concern, several states have legalized 
marijuana completely showing that state led experimentation can and does occur. 105  
Election reform would have far deeper ramifications than any single legalization of a 
commodity, but federalism is the likeliest avenue to reform. States like Maine have begun to 
experiment with novel and representative election methods. As Americans witness the 
consequence of more competitive and representative systems it is not unlikely that they will seek 
change in their own states. Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution guarantees a republican form 
of government. 106 How this is accomplished is entirely up to the citizens.   
Recent frustrations with the American election system have centered on the electoral 
college. The college is a national districting plan. Such a system inevitably warps representation. 
Arguably, the college is not the root problem. Every representative republic faces the age-old 
dilemma of aptly representing rural and urban regions. The college ensures that even Americans 
in rural regions will have a voice in national politics. Removing such a system for the office of 
 
104 McNearney, Allison. “The Complicated History of Cannabis in the US”. History.com. 20 April, 2018.  
105 Berke, Jeremy & Skye Gould. “Illinois Just became the first state to legalize marijuana sales through the 
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president may correct some issues but it fails to address other endemic representation problems. 
These include the spoiler effect of third-party candidates, the ability of plurality winners to 
disregard large blocks of voters, and a win at all cost campaign strategy that degrades the 
political process. In response to such frustrations, over 11 states have drafted legislation for 
electoral college members to promise their votes to the winner of the popular vote. 107  
Almost any alternative voting system is more representative than the first past the post 
system used in America today. Along with the recommendation of Majority Judgement, it was 
demonstrated that the type of national government a country has affects the happiness of its 
citizens. This seemingly intuitive concept has not been researched more fully due to the 
intangible nature of happiness. Despite this fact, quantifying happiness is the first step toward 
discovering more empirical strategies for evaluating election systems. Citizens who have a voice 
in their economic and political life are significantly happier than those who do not.  
This thesis covered three main areas that undermine representation in the United States. 
Special interest groups and gerrymandering undermine representation and can have long-lasting 
effects on political substructures. Referendums, while useful in some instances, frequently 
produce results paradoxical to majority desires and can restrict minority political access. Election 
systems, as they stand, have structural elements that resist change and competition and can lead 
to unresponsive governments. Failing to address these areas offers to reinforce voter apathy, 
entrench partisanship, and weaken the perceived legitimacy of American government.  
 
107 Kelly, Caroline. “New Colorado Law will give state’s electoral college votes to national popular vote winner”. 




It is recommended that state-led legislation be drafted to incorporate measures resisting 
both intentional and unintentional gerrymandering using the efficiency gap and the turn based 
(cake) strategy. Referendums can be better understood and implemented through a study on 
minority relationships within specific states based on Simon Hug and George Tsebelis’s 
referendum classifications. States should also incorporate changes to their election processes. A 
key recommendation of this thesis is for states to implement Majority Judgement voting as 
proposed by Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki. This type of range voting is the most expressive 
and resistant to strategic voting. Voters are encouraged to vote their optimal choice, a majority of 
votes is required for a winner, expressiveness can be captured more aptly, and the system is 
much easier for voters to understand than a ranked system.  
Following these prescriptions offers a promising correction to inadequate representation 
in the United States. The framers of the nation knew national change would be required 
periodically. They created a constitutional process for this to occur. Revolutionizing the way 
elections occur, however, is an innately risky endeavor. As such, a constitutional amendment 
may not be the best avenue. Federalism then, is the solution to the issue. States should lead the 
way to address the growing recognition of representative inefficiency in the United States. Doing 
so offers to drastically improve the political process, demonstrate the power of federalism, and 
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